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Abolition 2000 Europe

Background documents


THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Signed at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war, In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assem­bly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of Interna­tional Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safe­guarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties of the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective, Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discon­tinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strength­ening of trust between the States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weap­ons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatso­ever nuclear weapons or other explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way assist, encourage. or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transfer or whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control any here.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful pur­poses, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with the article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activi­ties, including the international exchange of nuclear material for the processing. use or produc­tion of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the Interna­tional Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co­operate in contributing alone or together with other States or in international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude an charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non­nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Article VIII

l. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any Party upon deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or of accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X

l. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopard­ized it supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish, and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty, DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day of July one thousand nine hundred sixty-eight.



EP RESOLUTION NPT CONFERENCE 1995

EP Resolution on the Conference on the Extension of the Nuclear Non­Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in New York from 17 April to 12 May 1995

A4-0054/1995

The European Parliament,

- having regard to its resolutions of 11 March 1993 on stopping nuclear tests by the nuclear powers (1) of 24 June 1993 on the moratoria on nuclear testing(2) of 21 April 1994 on energy priorities in the revised Non­Proliferation Treaty (NPT)(3) of 29 September 1994 on illegal trafficking in nuclear materials(4) and of 17 November 1994 on nuclear testing and the UN General Assembly's debate on disarmament(5)

- having regard to the results of the four conferences held in 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990 to revise the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,

- having regard to the conclusions of the Corfu European Council and to the Council Decision of 25 July 1994 concerning the joint action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union regarding preparation for the 1995 Conference of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(6), with a view to bringing about the indefinite and unconditional extension of that Treaty,

- having regard to the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament entitled 'The illicit traffic in radioactive substances and nuclear materials', COM(94)0383 - C4-0227/94,

- having regard to Rule 148 of its Rules of Procedure,

- having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy and the opinion of the Committee on Research, Technological Development and Energy (A4-0054/1995)

A. whereas the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which entered into force on 5 March 1970 is due in accordance with Article X for indefinite or periodic renewal after 25 years, and whereas the Contracting Parties have to take a majority decision on this matter in 1995,

B. whereas a considerable number of the Contracting Parties, particularly those from the Third World, have expressed scepticism regarding the indefinite extension of the NPT, principally on the grounds that the Treaty discriminates against non-nuclear States, that it offers inadequate protection against nuclear proliferation and in particular that the nuclear powers have failed to meet their obligations under the NPT (in particular Art. IV and Art. VI thereof),

C. whereas the concluding document of the 1985 NPT Review Conference called on the UN Conference on Disarmament (Geneva) to proceed to early multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament; whereas this mandate has never been fulfilled,

D. whereas the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles represents a growing threat to world peace and whereas, in spite of repeated efforts to curb proliferation and some partial successes in limiting the number of States possessing nuclear weapons, it has not been possible to restrict the overall expansion of know-how and the capacity to manufacture such weapons, with even States parties to the NPT, such as Iraq and North Korea, having moved towards the possession of nuclear weapons,

E. firmly believing that the Middle-East peace process should lead to the establishment of a zone which is free from weapons of mass destruction - an objective to which all the countries in the region should commit themselves,

F. whereas a great number of Contracting States to the NPT consider that the nuclear powers have not adequately complied with their obligations under the Treaty,

G. convinced that agreement on an indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT will only have credibility when certain elements have been fulfilled by the nuclear powers,

H. whereas there are several non-contracting states which are "de facto" nuclear military states,

I. whereas the indefinite and unconditional option is not necessarily the one which puts more political pressure on current non-contracting parties to join, particularly those which are nuclear military states,

J. concerned that the NPT negotiations could reach a stalemate, particularly if the negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) also fail to make any progress,

K. having regard to the particular importance which energy considerations will acquire in the future guarantee system, namely the importance to both the guarantee policy and the energy policy of converting nuclear warheads into fuel for nuclear power stations in view of the fact that, in the former Soviet Union alone, between 27,000 and 30,000 tactical and strategic nuclear weapons are in storage;

L. convinced that, in spite of all its problems and shortcomings, the NPT represents the main pillar in efforts by the international community to prevent nuclear proliferation,

M. whereas the changed political situation since 1990 regarding the dangers of nuclear proliferation has meant that many supervisory mechanisms have disappeared and whereas the range of ballistic missiles has increased to an alarming level,

N. stressing that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is an essential aim with a view to achieving an indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT,

O. regretting that the two EU nuclear powers, France and the UK, have not as yet publicly expressed the same degree of support in the Geneva CTBT talks for concluding such a Treaty as has, for example, the USA,

P. disturbed at the nuclear tests still being carried out by the People's Republic of China in disregard of the international moratoria, in spite of the Chinese Foreign Minister's assertion that his government is in favour of signing a nuclear test ban treaty,

1. Supports the option of indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT;

2. Calls on the States Parties to the NPT, in particular the Member States of the European Union and the nuclear powers, to fulfil the elements listed below so as to permit the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT at the New York Conference;

3. Calls on the Member States of the European Union to put every effort into bringing about the speediest possible conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the Geneva Conference, and to take a joint action to this end under Article J.3 TEU;

4. Calls on the Member States of the European Union, pending the abovementioned joint action, expressly to refrain from any nuclear testing;

5. Calls on all nuclear powers to fulfil their obligations under Article VI of the NPT and to agree on a timetable and funding plan to this end;

6. Calls on the Member States of the European Union to take an initiative for a negotiation in the UN Conference on Disarmament for a nuclear weapons convention leading to global nuclear disarmament as stated in the objectives of Article VI of the NPT;

7. Calls for a ban on the production of fissile material usable for military purposes; supports the call for the creation of an international office to control plutonium and highly enriched uranium and requests the Council to take a joint action to this end under Article J.3 TEU;

8. Supports the calls by those States Parties to the NPT which possess neither their own military nuclear capability nor any appropriate protection in the form of a military alliance, for stronger guarantees of security through effective action to uphold respect for international law and the provisions of the UN Charter against aggression;

9. Endorses the draft resolution submitted by Russia, on behalf of the five major nuclear powers, to the UN Security Council, under the terms of which those powers undertake to offer guarantees to the non-nuclear states which have signed the NPT in the event of aggression against them;

10. Calls on the nuclear powers to give a general and mutual undertaking, in the context of the provisions of the NPT, to refrain from using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states;

11. Calls for all NPT Contracting Parties to comply with the provisions of Article IV of the NPT on cooperation aimed at the development of non-nuclear sustainable energy on the territory of those Contracting States which wish it, including a guarantee of effective supervision of 'dual use' goods;

12. Suggests that the Joint Research Centre should be involved in and should contribute to the CAPRA programme for the reduction of actinides and spent plutonium;

13. Calls for all NPT Contracting Parties to stimulate international cooperation on the development of alternative and sustainable energy sources as a more promising strategy in order to meet the energy needs of all Contracting Parties, and calls in particular on the Member States of the European Union to initiate cooperation measures in this area with the other Contracting Parties;

14. Calls for the Community position adopted at the negotiating table to promote all the aims of the NPT by means of stronger legal and diplomatic measures which can be relied upon to prevent proliferation and, at the same time, by giving a strong boost to effective nuclear disarmament carried out under international supervision, as provided for in Article VI of the Treaty; also calls for the Community's position to include, for this purpose, the establishment of a comprehensive international system for monitoring the entire cycle undergone by uranium, plutonium and, possibly, thorium for civilian uses, including materials derived from the military cycle as a result of the partial dismantling of nuclear stockpiles, with particular provisions relating to tritium;

15. Calls on the participants in the Conference to provide for unequivocal sanctions to punish failure to comply with the provisions of the Treaty;

16. Considers that effective sanctions must be imposed, under the auspices of the UN, against Parties to the NPT who can be shown to have breached its provisions (such as Iraq and North Korea in the past), as well as against other States producing nuclear weapons apparently with a view to hostilities or blackmail;

17. Calls on the international community to create the legal conditions for the criminal prosecution of offences in connection with illicit nuclear proliferation, including the illicit traffic in radioactive substances and nuclear materials;

18. Stresses the need for the fullest cooperation between states acceding to the NPT to prevent terrorist organizations, including fanatical religious sects, from acquiring weapons of mass destruction;

19. Advocates the strengthening and rationalisation of international safeguards and resolves to pursue this matter further, to include:

- coordination of safeguards procedures through independent assessment of safeguard technolo­gies, as applied by Euratom and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna (IAEA) to large bulk handling facilities - reprocessing plants, enrichment plants and fabrication plants,

- challenge inspections, not announced in advance and backed up by an effective sanctions regime,

- an integrated and coordinated EU licensing system, ranging from dual-use equipment, spare parts etc. at the beginning of the cycle, to nuclear technology and fissile material at the end,

- acceptance of full-scope safeguards on all nuclear facilities,

- application of full-scope safeguards, if shown effective, without discrimination to all nuclear facilities within EU Member States, and denying transfers of nuclear facilities and materials to nations which do not accept full-scope safeguards;

20. Calls on the participants in the Conference, particularly the Member States of the European Union, to ensure that the IAEA is given a firm financial basis and sufficient staff to carry out its monitoring tasks;

21. Supports the IAEA's proposal for the introduction of environmental monitoring and other methods of verification proposed in the IAEA 93+2 process;

22. Calls for the Community position to include all the considerations set out in its above mentioned resolution of 21 April 1994 and for the negotiations to be concerned with improving the existing guarantee system so that it incorporates the multilateral balance required to eliminate discrimination between countries regarded as nuclear powers and those without weapons in accordance with the terms defined in the NPT;

23. Hopes that all those states which have not as yet concluded a full-scope safeguard agreement with the IAEA will do so; and calls for the investigation of the smuggling of fissile material from guarded Euratom facilities to be stepped up;

24. Calls for the nuclear powers to open all their own nuclear facilities to inspection by the IAEA;

25. Supports the establishment of a nuclear weapons register at the UN and calls on the Member States of the European Union to take an initiative to propose such a register during the NPT review conference;

26. Calls on all states which have not in the past participated in the NPT to accede to the Treaty, and calls on the European Union and its Member States to develop a policy aimed at reducing tensions in sensitive regions and at meeting the security concerns of nuclear threshold countries if they agree to join the Treaty;

27. Calls for the European Union, on the basis of Article VII of the NPT, to lead a political initiative to promote regional solutions under which, in addition to the setting up of denuclearized zones covering the entire globe and the permanent removal of the nuclear threat, realistic solutions would be drawn up to meet the energy requirements of the areas in question, the necessary technology transfers would be facilitated, checks on the use of dual techniques would be stepped up and the use of detection methods and the investigation of any major secret programmes would be promoted;

28. Welcomes the decision by Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine to join the NPT as nuclear­weapons-free states, and calls on the Member States of the European Union to honour these decisions, with their costly consequences for the states concerned, by appropriate aid and compensation measures;

29. Stresses, in this context, the importance of ensuring the employment of former Soviet military nuclear scientists for civil purposes and urges the EU to be ready to contribute to this end;

30. Welcomes South Africa's exemplary decision to do away with its nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT;

31. Urges the participants in the conference to do their utmost to avoid a 'temporary solution' with uncertain consequences for the entire international community;

32. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the Governments and Parliaments of the Member States, the President of the UN General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the UN, the chairman of the UN Disarmament Conference in Geneva and the Secretariat of the New York Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(1) OJ C 115, 26.04.1993, p. 158.
(2) OJ C 194, 19.07.1993, p. 206.
(3) OJ C 128, 9.5.1994, p. 378.
(4) C 305, 31.10.1994, p. 78.
(5) OJ C 341, 5.12.1994, p. 178.
(6) OJ L 205, 8.8.1994, p. 1.



EC THESSALONIKI RESOLUTION ON WMD

1. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery such as ballistic missiles is a growing threat to international peace and security. A number of states have sought or are seeking to develop such weapons. The risk that terrorists will acquire chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials adds a new dimension to this threat.

2. The European Union cannot ignore these dangers. WMD and missile proliferation puts at risk the security of our states, our peoples and our interests around the world. Meeting this challenge must be a central element in the EU external action, including the common foreign and security policy. Our objective is to deter, halt and, where possible, reverse proliferation programmes of concern worldwide.

3. Drawing on the Basic Principles already established, we are committed to further elaborate before the end of the year a coherent EU strategy to address the threat of proliferation, and to continue to develop and implement the EU Action Plan as a matter of priority. Our starting point will be a comprehensive and regularly updated threat analysis. Our approach will be guided by our commitment to uphold and implement the multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements; our support for the multilateral institutions charged respectively with verification and upholding of compliance with these treaties; our commitment to strong national and internationally-coordinated export controls; and our commitment to co-operate with the United States and other partners who share our objectives. We recognise that appropriate steps towards the goal of general and complete disarmament can contribute to furthering non-proliferation objectives; and we are determined to play our part in addressing the problems of regional instability and insecurity and the situations of conflict which lie behind many weapons programmes, recognising that instability does not occur in a vacuum.

4. We have a wide range of instruments available: multilateral treaties and verification mechanisms; national and internationally­coordinated export controls; co-operative threat reduction programmes; political and economic levers; interdiction of illegal procurement activities; and, as a last resort, coercive measures in accordance with the UN Charter. While all are necessary, none is sufficient in itself. We need to strengthen them all, and deploy those which are most effective in each case.

5. The European Union has special strengths and experience to bring to this collective effort. In further implementing our Action Plan, we will focus in particular on:

universalising further the key disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, agreements and arrangements, and where necessary strengthening them, and in particular the means of ensuring compliance with their provisions. We emphasise that full compliance lies at the core of the co-operative approach to collective security and is a pre-condition for interna­tional stability and security;

enhancing our political, financial and technical support for agencies in charge of verification. In particular, we are determined to bring into force our IAEA Additional Protocols before the end of 2003;

fostering the role of the UN Security Council, and enhancing its expertise in meeting the challenge of proliferation; strengthening export control policies and practices within the European Union and beyond, in co-ordination with Partners;

strengthening identification, control and interception of illegal shipments, including national criminal sanctions against those who contribute to illicit procurement efforts;

enhancing the security of proliferation-sensitive materials, equipment and expertise in the European Union against unauthorised access and risks of diversion;

reinforcing EU co-operative threat reduction programmes with third countries, targeted at support for disarmament, control and security of sensitive materials, facilities and exper­tise;

ways to deploy the EU's political, diplomatic and economic influence most effectively in support of our non-proliferation objectives. EU economic cooperation or development assistance with third countries should take account of WMD proliferation concerns;

setting up a unit within the Council Secretariat, which would function as a monitoring centre, entrusted with the monitoring of the consistent implementation of the Action Plan and the collection of information and intelligence.

6. We request the Council, as a matter of urgency, to take forward this work, on the basis of the Action Plan an drawing on the Basic Principles agreed on 16 June 2003 by the EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

EP RESOLUTION NPT Review Conference 2005


Text as adopted:EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 1999-2004 Session document: 26 February 2004 MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION, pursuant to Rule 37(4) of the Rules of Procedure, on nuclear disarmament: Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2005 - EU preparation of third NPT PrepCom (New York, 26 April - 7 May 2004)

Text as adopted by the European Parliament in its Plenary Session in Brussels, Thursday 26 February 2004

European Parliament resolution on nuclear disarmament: Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2005 - EU preparation of third NPT PrepCom (New York, 26 April - 7 May 2004)

The European Parliament, - having regard to Rule 37(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the 2000 Conference of the states party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) asked the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to establish an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament, as contained in the fourth of the 13 points relating to Article VI of the NPT adopted by the 2000 NPT Conference,

B. whereas all the EU Member States are states party to the NPT and two EU Member States are nuclear weapon states as defined in the NPT,

C. whereas the CD has neither established the requested subsidiary body within three years after the Review Conference nor is currently in the process of so doing,

D. whereas the European Parliament has shown a major concern for nuclear disarmament and deliberated on this topic on numerous occasions in recent years,

E. whereas confidence in international security depends upon steps being taken towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, in both declared and undeclared nuclear weapon states, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT,

F. whereas the NPT remains the relevant international law on nuclear disarmament, the enforcement of which needs a road map with a schedule of disarmament steps and deadlines,

G. whereas Article VI of the NPT imposes the obligation on all States Parties to the Treaty to 'pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control',

H. whereas serious threats to international security include terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the existence of failed states and organised crime,

I. deeply concerned about a new era of proliferation with not just governments handing over technology and knowledge, but also individuals and companies,

J. taking note of the declarations of Professor Abdul Qadeer Khan, the senior Pakistani scientist who admitted leaking nuclear weapons secrets to Iran, Libya, North Korea, Malaysia and Iraq,

K. seriously concerned about the world black market in nuclear-related materials, which is likely to promote the proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-state actors,

L. having regard to the new EU Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction adopted by the European Council in Brussels on 12 December 2003, …………………………………………………………………

1. Reaffirms its position that the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is of vital importance for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and that therefore every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects;

2. Recalls that the EU's objective is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and expects the declared and undeclared nuclear weapon states to engage actively with this issue and to make further progress towards reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons;

3. Calls upon the EU and its Member States - in a spirit of 'effective multilateralism' and solidarity and in pursuit of the EU Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction - to form a common front at the NPT PrepCom and the NPT Review Conference in 2005, and make a positive contribution to the discussions; urges that their statements attach special importance to new initiatives on nuclear disarmament and the revitalisation of the UN Conference on Disarmament;

4. Calls upon the Irish Presidency and the Member States to add further substance to their common statement that 'the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) must be preserved in its integrity';

5. Calls upon the Irish Presidency - in support of the Union's Common Position on the Universalisation and Reinforcement of Multilateral Agreements in the Field of Non-proliferation of WMD and their Means of Delivery - to make a statement on the EU's Common Position and the EU Strategy at the NPT PrepCom;

6. Calls upon the EU to work with its international partners to develop and promote the principles to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from gaining access to weapons and materials of mass destruction;

7. Calls upon the Council and the Commission to use the experience of Euratom to set up a programme aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear materials, technology and knowledge in the world;

8. Calls upon the Irish Presidency and the Member States to provide further substance by outlining how they aim to achieve their common objective in the EU WMD Strategy to 'foster the role of the UN Security Council, and enhance expertise in meeting the challenge of proliferation', specifically how the states parties to the NPT might retain the unique verification and inspection experience of UNMOVIC, for example by means of a roster of experts;

9. Calls upon the Irish Presidency and the Member States to suggest how they can persuade third states to accede to the IAEA Additional Protocols, given the fact that all EU Member States have signed and ratified these protocols;

10. Calls upon the Irish Presidency and the Member States to clarify how they might commit themselves to releasing financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA;

11. Calls upon the EU to propose, at the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting in 2004 and at the Review Conference in 2005, that the appropriate subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament be established by the CD without further delay;

12. Calls upon the EU to develop the necessary coordination mechanisms (the EU's WMD Monitoring Unit in liaison with the EU Situation Centre) to ensure that intelligence is used to build solidarity and confidence between the Member States on WMD policy;

13. Stresses the importance and urgency of signature and ratification, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with institutional processes, to achieve the earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty; calls on the Council and the Commission to insist on this in the dialogue with those State partners which have not yet ratified the CTBT and/or the NPT;

14. Reiterates its call upon the USA to stop the development of new generations of battlefield nuclear weapons (bunkerbusters) and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;

15. Expresses its support for the international Mayors' campaign - initiated by the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki - on nuclear disarmament;

16. Calls upon both the Council and the Commission to present a progress report to the European Parliament on the outcome of the NPT PrepCom;

17. Strongly believes that nuclear disarmament activity will contribute significantly to international security and strategic stability and also reduce the risk of thefts of plutonium by terrorists;

18. Calls upon all states, and nuclear weapon states in particular, not to provide assistance or encouragement to states which may seek to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in particular those states which are not parties to the Non-proliferation Treaty;

19. Recognises the positive moves made by Iran in signing the additional protocol on nuclear material standards and hopes that the Majlis will ratify the text within a reasonable period;

20. Welcomes Libya's intention to renounce nuclear weapons programmes and to welcome unconditional inspections;

21. Calls on the EU to work with its international partners to develop and promote a nuclear free zone in the Middle-East;

22. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the governments of the Member States, the UN Secretary-General and all States Parties to the Convention.



EP RESOLUTION NPT Review Conference 2005

Text as adopted:EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 2004-2009 Session document

European Parliament resolution on the Non-Proliferation Treaty 2005 Review Conference – Nuclear arms in North Korea and Iran

The European Parliament - Thursday 10 March 2005,

– having regard to Rule 103(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. taking into account and reiterating its previous resolutions on nuclear disarmament, and in particular its resolution of 26 February 2004(1) on the Preparatory Committee meeting for the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2005,

B. underlining that the European Security Strategy and the EU's Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as adopted by the enlarged EU, emphasise the importance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,

C. recognising that all the Member States are States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and that two Member States are nuclear-weapon states as defined in the NPT,

D. recalling the statement in the report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, set up by the UN Secretary-General, that 'we are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation',

1. Reaffirms its position that the NPT is of vital importance to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to nuclear disarmament;

2. Recalls that the EU's and the NPT's ultimate objective is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and expects both declared and undeclared nuclear-weapon states to engage actively with this issue and to make further progress towards reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons;

3. Calls on the EU and its Member States – in a spirit of 'effective multilateralism' and solidarity and in pursuit of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD – to form a common front at the NPT Review Conference in 2005 and make a positive contribution to the discussions; urges that their statements attach special importance to new initiatives on nuclear disarmament and the revitalisation of the UN Conference on Disarmament;

4. Calls on the Council and the Member States to add further substance to their common statement that NPT 'must be preserved' and – in support of the EU's Common Position on the Universalisation and Reinforcement of Multilateral Agreements in the Field of Non-Proliferation of WMD and their Means of Delivery – to make a statement on the EU's Common Position and Strategy at the NPT Review Conference;

5. Calls on the Council and the Member States to work towards the effective implementation of point 15.3 of the section entitled 'Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12' of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference in order to achieve a treaty effectively banning the production of all weapons making use of fissile materials;

6. Calls on the EU to work with its international partners, including NATO, to develop and promote the principles to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from gaining access to weapons and materials of mass destruction; asks the States Parties to fulfil their commitments made in UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-state actors and proliferation of nuclear weapons;

7. Calls on the Council and the Commission to set up a programme aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear materials, technology and knowledge in the world;

8. Calls on all states, and nuclear-weapon states in particular, not to provide assistance or encourage states which may seek to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in particular those states which are not parties to the NPT;

9. Stresses its strong belief that nuclear disarmament activity will contribute significantly to international security and strategic stability and also reduce the risk of thefts of plutonium or highly enriched uranium by terrorists; urges the EU to support the new international initiative on new nuclear dangers, as proposed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Mohammed El Baradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which points to the need to secure nuclear disarmament by both declared and undeclared nuclear weapon states;

10. Urges the EU to work hard for the adoption of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention that has already been deposited at the UN and which could provide a framework of steps within a legally binding disarmament process;

11. Calls on the Luxembourg Presidency and the Council to provide further substance by outlining how they aim to achieve their common objective in the EU's WMD Strategy to 'foster the role of the UN Security Council, and enhance expertise in meeting the challenge of proliferation', and, specifically, how the States Parties to the NPT might retain the unique verification and inspection experience of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, for example by means of a roster of experts;

12. Calls on the Council and the Commission to come forward with a proposal to persuade third states and the Member States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the IAEA Additional Protocols;

13. Calls on the Council and the Member States to clarify and step up their commitment to releasing financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA;

14. Calls on the EU to propose, at the NPT Review Conference in 2005, that the appropriate subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament be established by the UN Commission on Disarmament without further delay;

15. Calls on the EU to develop the necessary coordination mechanisms (the EU's WMD Monitoring Unit in liaison with the EU Situation Centre) to ensure that intelligence is used to build solidarity and confidence between the Member States on WMD policy;

16. Stresses the importance and urgency of signature and ratification, without delay, without conditions and in accordance with institutional processes of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), to ensure its earliest possible entry into force; calls on the Council and the Commission to insist on this in the dialogue with those partner states which have not yet ratified the CTBT and/or the NPT;

17. Reiterates its call for the USA to stop the development of new generations of battlefield nuclear weapons (bunkerbusters) and to sign and ratify the CTBT; also calls on the USA to clarify the situation as regards the quantity and strategic objectives of its tactical nuclear arsenals stationed on European bases;

18. Calls on Israel, India and Pakistan to become States Parties to the NPT;

19. Welcomes the appeal, signed by 25 Nobel Prize Winners, calling on the governments of the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, to support and implement steps to lower the operational status of their nuclear weapon systems in order to reduce the risk of nuclear catastrophe; supports the proposal made by the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the establishment of a 'nuclear-free zone' in the Middle East, and calls for an effort to be made to this end;

20. Renews its support for the international mayors' campaign - initiated by the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki - on nuclear disarmament, and recommends that the international community carefully consider the campaign's 'Project Vision 2020', urging a scheduled programme of elimination of all nuclear weapons;

21. Welcomes the inclusion of Non-Proliferation of WMD clauses in the latest EU agreements with third countries and actions plans; points out that such measures must be implemented by all the EU partner countries without exception ;

22. Stresses that the prevention of any threat to the security of any country requires a commitment by the international community; emphasises the need for stronger regional and multilateral security structures in the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent and North-East Asia in order to reduce the pressure towards nuclear proliferation and to achieve the abandonment of nuclear programmes;

23. Calls for all political and diplomatic avenues to be explored in order to secure a peaceful settlement to the conflicts linked to nuclear proliferation;

Iran

24. Notes with concern that Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, reiterated on 27 February 2005 that Tehran would not give up its 'right under the NPT to enrich uranium', and calls on the Iranian authorities to stop making confusing and contradictory statements;

25. Takes note that, on 27 February 2005, Russia and Iran signed a nuclear fuel supply agreement paving the way for Iran to start up its first atomic reactor in Bushehr next year and obliging Tehran to repatriate all spent nuclear fuel to Russia;

26. Calls on the Council to open an initiative with the Government of the Russian Federation to obtain guarantees that its recent agreement with Iran on the delivery of nuclear material is solely intended for civilian use and to ensure support for EU diplomatic efforts; counts on the IAEA to monitor closely the fuel transfers between Russia and Iran;

27. Welcomes IAEA Director General Mohammed El Baradei's declaration at the end of January 2005 as to the progress made by the agency's nuclear safeguard inspectors over the last 15 months in understanding the nature and scope of Iran's nuclear programme;

28. Reaffirms its full support for the Paris agreement of 15 November 2004, in which Iran made the commitment to suspend its uranium enrichment programme, and to the EU 3 approach of dialogue with the Iranian authorities in order to ensure a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the nuclear issues concerning that country; calls for objective guarantees from the Iranian Government as to the non-military nature of its nuclear programme;

29. Calls on Iran to reaffirm its commitment to the NPT and to make permanent its decision to suspend uranium enrichment, thus providing lasting confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran's intentions and paving the way for a cooperative partnership between the EU and Iran; insists that negotiations on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement should be linked to a satisfactory conclusion to the nuclear issue and the establishment of reassuring verification measures;

30. Calls on the Council and the Commission to enter into negotiations with the Iranian authorities on the transfer of technology and know-how, as well as on financial support for renewable energy;

31. Calls on the Iranian Parliament to conclude the parliamentary ratification of the Additional Protocol to the NPT;

32. Calls on the US Government to fully support the EU diplomatic approach to resolving this problem, considers this question essential to a renewed transatlantic agenda and welcomes the recent US statement on this matter, as well as earlier assertions that it would not engage in preventive military action against Iran;

North Korea

33. Is deeply concerned that North Korea declared on 10 February 2005 that it possesses nuclear weapons and suspended its participation in the six-party talks on its nuclear programme for an indefinite period of time;

34. Notes North Korea's statement that its 'end objective is a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula' and urges it to abide by its obligations under the NPT, and urges its government and the other parties involved to take concrete steps in negotiations and adopt a constructive approach;

35. Urges North Korea to rejoin the NPT, to revoke its decision to withdraw from the six-party talks and to allow the resumption of negotiations in order to find a peaceful solution to the crisis in the Korean peninsula;

36. Urges both North Korea and the US to enable a speedy resolution of the current crisis, initially by the US offering to recommence the supply of heavy fuel oil in exchange for the verified freezing of the Yongbyon plant, to avoid further deterioration of the current situation;

37. Urges the Council to consider once again paying EUR 4 million of the costs of suspension of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation to South Korea, taking into account the fact that this initiative played a significant role in the recent past, and recognising that it could well serve to supply conventional energy in the future;

38. Believes that the EU should support renewed efforts to enable North Korea to renounce the further use of nuclear energy in exchange for guaranteed energy supplies;

39. Calls on the Council and the Commission to offer financial support for heavy fuel oil supplies to remedy North Korea's primary energy needs, and asks the Commission and the Council to make the necessary approaches regarding EU participation in future six-party talks while at the same time making it clear that 'No Say, No Pay' is a principle which the EU will follow in its dealings with the Korean Peninsula;

40. Is aware that central to the ongoing crisis are the claims that North Korea has a full fledged highly enriched uranium programme and has supplied uranium to Libya; considering, however, that neither of these claims has been substantiated, asks for a public hearing in the European Parliament to evaluate the claims; ° ° °

41. Calls on both the Council and the Commission to present a progress report to Parliament on the outcome of the 2005 NPT Review Conference in due time;

42. Recommends that an official Parliament delegation attend the NPT Review Conference;

43. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Presidency in office of the Council, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the UN Secretary-General, the governments and parliaments of Iran and North Korea, all States Parties to the NPT and the IAEA.