Abolition 2000 Europe

New NPT Resolution adopted in European Parliament

European Parliament resolution on the Non-Proliferation Treaty 2005 Review Conference – Nuclear arms in North Korea and Iran

The European Parliament - Thursday 10 March 2005,

– having regard to Rule 103(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. taking into account and reiterating its previous resolutions on nuclear disarmament, and in particular its resolution of 26 February 2004(1) on the Preparatory Committee meeting for the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2005,

B. underlining that the European Security Strategy and the EU's Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as adopted by the enlarged EU, emphasise the importance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,

C. recognising that all the Member States are States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and that two Member States are nuclear-weapon states as defined in the NPT,

D. recalling the statement in the report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, set up by the UN Secretary-General, that 'we are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation',

1. Reaffirms its position that the NPT is of vital importance to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to nuclear disarmament;

2. Recalls that the EU's and the NPT's ultimate objective is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and expects both declared and undeclared nuclear-weapon states to engage actively with this issue and to make further progress towards reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons;

3. Calls on the EU and its Member States – in a spirit of 'effective multilateralism' and solidarity and in pursuit of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD – to form a common front at the NPT Review Conference in 2005 and make a positive contribution to the discussions; urges that their statements attach special importance to new initiatives on nuclear disarmament and the revitalisation of the UN Conference on Disarmament;

4. Calls on the Council and the Member States to add further substance to their common statement that NPT 'must be preserved' and – in support of the EU's Common Position on the Universalisation and Reinforcement of Multilateral Agreements in the Field of Non-Proliferation of WMD and their Means of Delivery – to make a statement on the EU's Common Position and Strategy at the NPT Review Conference;

5. Calls on the Council and the Member States to work towards the effective implementation of point 15.3 of the section entitled 'Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12' of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference in order to achieve a treaty effectively banning the production of all weapons making use of fissile materials;

6. Calls on the EU to work with its international partners, including NATO, to develop and promote the principles to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from gaining access to weapons and materials of mass destruction; asks the States Parties to fulfil their commitments made in UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-state actors and proliferation of nuclear weapons;

7. Calls on the Council and the Commission to set up a programme aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear materials, technology and knowledge in the world;

8. Calls on all states, and nuclear-weapon states in particular, not to provide assistance or encourage states which may seek to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in particular those states which are not parties to the NPT;

9. Stresses its strong belief that nuclear disarmament activity will contribute significantly to international security and strategic stability and also reduce the risk of thefts of plutonium or highly enriched uranium by terrorists; urges the EU to support the new international initiative on new nuclear dangers, as proposed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Mohammed El Baradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which points to the need to secure nuclear disarmament by both declared and undeclared nuclear weapon states;

10. Urges the EU to work hard for the adoption of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention that has already been deposited at the UN and which could provide a framework of steps within a legally binding disarmament process;

11. Calls on the Luxembourg Presidency and the Council to provide further substance by outlining how they aim to achieve their common objective in the EU's WMD Strategy to 'foster the role of the UN Security Council, and enhance expertise in meeting the challenge of proliferation', and, specifically, how the States Parties to the NPT might retain the unique verification and inspection experience of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, for example by means of a roster of experts;

12. Calls on the Council and the Commission to come forward with a proposal to persuade third states and the Member States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the IAEA Additional Protocols;

13. Calls on the Council and the Member States to clarify and step up their commitment to releasing financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA;

14. Calls on the EU to propose, at the NPT Review Conference in 2005, that the appropriate subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament be established by the UN Commission on Disarmament without further delay;

15. Calls on the EU to develop the necessary coordination mechanisms (the EU's WMD Monitoring Unit in liaison with the EU Situation Centre) to ensure that intelligence is used to build solidarity and confidence between the Member States on WMD policy;

16. Stresses the importance and urgency of signature and ratification, without delay, without conditions and in accordance with institutional processes of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), to ensure its earliest possible entry into force; calls on the Council and the Commission to insist on this in the dialogue with those partner states which have not yet ratified the CTBT and/or the NPT;

17. Reiterates its call for the USA to stop the development of new generations of battlefield nuclear weapons (bunkerbusters) and to sign and ratify the CTBT; also calls on the USA to clarify the situation as regards the quantity and strategic objectives of its tactical nuclear arsenals stationed on European bases;

18. Calls on Israel, India and Pakistan to become States Parties to the NPT;

19. Welcomes the appeal, signed by 25 Nobel Prize Winners, calling on the governments of the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, to support and implement steps to lower the operational status of their nuclear weapon systems in order to reduce the risk of nuclear catastrophe; supports the proposal made by the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the establishment of a 'nuclear-free zone' in the Middle East, and calls for an effort to be made to this end;

20. Renews its support for the international mayors' campaign - initiated by the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki - on nuclear disarmament, and recommends that the international community carefully consider the campaign's 'Project Vision 2020', urging a scheduled programme of elimination of all nuclear weapons;

21. Welcomes the inclusion of Non-Proliferation of WMD clauses in the latest EU agreements with third countries and actions plans; points out that such measures must be implemented by all the EU partner countries without exception ;

22. Stresses that the prevention of any threat to the security of any country requires a commitment by the international community; emphasises the need for stronger regional and multilateral security structures in the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent and North-East Asia in order to reduce the pressure towards nuclear proliferation and to achieve the abandonment of nuclear programmes;

23. Calls for all political and diplomatic avenues to be explored in order to secure a peaceful settlement to the conflicts linked to nuclear proliferation;


24. Notes with concern that Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, reiterated on 27 February 2005 that Tehran would not give up its 'right under the NPT to enrich uranium', and calls on the Iranian authorities to stop making confusing and contradictory statements;

25. Takes note that, on 27 February 2005, Russia and Iran signed a nuclear fuel supply agreement paving the way for Iran to start up its first atomic reactor in Bushehr next year and obliging Tehran to repatriate all spent nuclear fuel to Russia;

26. Calls on the Council to open an initiative with the Government of the Russian Federation to obtain guarantees that its recent agreement with Iran on the delivery of nuclear material is solely intended for civilian use and to ensure support for EU diplomatic efforts; counts on the IAEA to monitor closely the fuel transfers between Russia and Iran;

27. Welcomes IAEA Director General Mohammed El Baradei's declaration at the end of January 2005 as to the progress made by the agency's nuclear safeguard inspectors over the last 15 months in understanding the nature and scope of Iran's nuclear programme;

28. Reaffirms its full support for the Paris agreement of 15 November 2004, in which Iran made the commitment to suspend its uranium enrichment programme, and to the EU 3 approach of dialogue with the Iranian authorities in order to ensure a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the nuclear issues concerning that country; calls for objective guarantees from the Iranian Government as to the non-military nature of its nuclear programme;

29. Calls on Iran to reaffirm its commitment to the NPT and to make permanent its decision to suspend uranium enrichment, thus providing lasting confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran's intentions and paving the way for a cooperative partnership between the EU and Iran; insists that negotiations on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement should be linked to a satisfactory conclusion to the nuclear issue and the establishment of reassuring verification measures;

30. Calls on the Council and the Commission to enter into negotiations with the Iranian authorities on the transfer of technology and know-how, as well as on financial support for renewable energy;

31. Calls on the Iranian Parliament to conclude the parliamentary ratification of the Additional Protocol to the NPT;

32. Calls on the US Government to fully support the EU diplomatic approach to resolving this problem, considers this question essential to a renewed transatlantic agenda and welcomes the recent US statement on this matter, as well as earlier assertions that it would not engage in preventive military action against Iran;

North Korea

33. Is deeply concerned that North Korea declared on 10 February 2005 that it possesses nuclear weapons and suspended its participation in the six-party talks on its nuclear programme for an indefinite period of time;

34. Notes North Korea's statement that its 'end objective is a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula' and urges it to abide by its obligations under the NPT, and urges its government and the other parties involved to take concrete steps in negotiations and adopt a constructive approach;

35. Urges North Korea to rejoin the NPT, to revoke its decision to withdraw from the six-party talks and to allow the resumption of negotiations in order to find a peaceful solution to the crisis in the Korean peninsula;

36. Urges both North Korea and the US to enable a speedy resolution of the current crisis, initially by the US offering to recommence the supply of heavy fuel oil in exchange for the verified freezing of the Yongbyon plant, to avoid further deterioration of the current situation;

37. Urges the Council to consider once again paying EUR 4 million of the costs of suspension of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation to South Korea, taking into account the fact that this initiative played a significant role in the recent past, and recognising that it could well serve to supply conventional energy in the future;

38. Believes that the EU should support renewed efforts to enable North Korea to renounce the further use of nuclear energy in exchange for guaranteed energy supplies;

39. Calls on the Council and the Commission to offer financial support for heavy fuel oil supplies to remedy North Korea's primary energy needs, and asks the Commission and the Council to make the necessary approaches regarding EU participation in future six-party talks while at the same time making it clear that 'No Say, No Pay' is a principle which the EU will follow in its dealings with the Korean Peninsula;

40. Is aware that central to the ongoing crisis are the claims that North Korea has a full fledged highly enriched uranium programme and has supplied uranium to Libya; considering, however, that neither of these claims has been substantiated, asks for a public hearing in the European Parliament to evaluate the claims; ° ° °

41. Calls on both the Council and the Commission to present a progress report to Parliament on the outcome of the 2005 NPT Review Conference in due time;

42. Recommends that an official Parliament delegation attend the NPT Review Conference;

43. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Presidency in office of the Council, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the UN Secretary-General, the governments and parliaments of Iran and North Korea, all States Parties to the NPT and the IAEA.

New NRDC Report: "U.S Nuclear Weapons in Europe"

A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning.

Click here for the report (.pdf, 5.0MB)

WASHINGTON, February 9th 2005 - The United States still keeps as many as 480 nuclear weapons at air bases across Europe, more than twice what independent military analysts had previously estimated, according to a new study that says the weapons' presence is hurting efforts to curb nuclear proliferation worldwide.

Military officials insisted that the size of the nuclear stockpile in Europe, while classified, was smaller than that, but acknowledged that it still existed to deter terrorists or rogue nations that could threaten America or its allies with unconventional weapons. These officials also say the stockpile's presence and its long-term fate has caused simmering tensions among senior NATO political and military officials.

The report by the Natural Resources Defense Council, a private group here that advocates arms control and monitors nuclear trends, says short-range nuclear bombs are stored under American control under secret military agreements at eight bases in Germany, Britain, Italy, Belgium, Turkey and the Netherlands. The bombs are kept in hardened sites under tight security.

American and allied air forces regularly rehearse nuclear bombing missions at training ranges in Europe in case a war calls for striking nuclear, chemical or biological weapons sites or command posts in countries that threaten to use unconventional arms, the report states. Military officials confirmed that this training continued as part of prudent military contingency planning.

The findings in the 102-page report, "U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe," come as NATO defense ministers, including Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, prepare to meet Wednesday and Thursday in Nice. An advance copy of the report was provided to The New York Times by the research council.

One topic of discussion in formal and informal sessions in Nice is likely to be nuclear proliferation, including concern over Iran's nuclear program, Pentagon and NATO officials said.

Captain Curry Graham, a spokesman for the military's European Command, said the United States still maintained a sizable nuclear arsenal in Europe to support NATO's strategic deterrence mission to "maintain peace and stability in the region."

Pentagon policy prohibits the disclosure of the amount or location of American nuclear weapons. However, a senior military official in Europe said in response to the report's findings that the number of American nuclear weapons there was now "around 200," and has been "significantly reduced" in recent years.

The official would not discuss against which countries or targets the weapons could be used, but officials in the past have left open the possibility, however remote, of using nuclear arms against targets in so-called "rogue" nations, including Iran and Syria, if they threatened to use unconventional weapons.

"Militarily, you can't rule out something like a biological threat, so this capability has not been taken off the table," said a former senior U.S. officer in Europe who said the report's accounting of weapons was "in the ballpark."

There is no proposal to reduce the U.S. nuclear arsenal in Europe, officials said, but the issue has caused strains among the alliance's political and military leaders.

"Some allies and U.S. military see a lot of value in going to zero," the senior military official in Europe said. "That said, some allies and U.S. military see value in at least keeping some capability."

General James Jones, head of the European Command and the top NATO military commander, has privately told associates that he favors eliminating the U.S. nuclear stockpile in Europe, but has run into resistance from some NATO political leaders. NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, the arm of the alliance that deals with nuclear policy, is to meet on Feb. 17, but it is unclear if the issue will come up then.

Spokesmen at the embassies of several European countries here declined to comment, citing their governments' policy of not discussing American nuclear weapons on their soil.

At the height of the cold war in the early 1970s, the United States had about 7,300 short-range nuclear weapons in Europe to be used as a last resort against a massive ground attack by the numerically superior Soviet military, the report said. Arms control agreements in the 1980s began to reduce that number, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, President George H.W. Bush announced in September 1991 that America would withdraw all tactical ground-launched and naval nuclear weapons worldwide.

About 1,400 air-delivered nuclear bombs were still left behind, the report says, but that number continued to dwindle over the next decade. The remaining weapons in Europe are B61 bombs that are less powerful than long-range nuclear arms fired from land-based silos or submarines, the report said.

American and NATO officials say they do not identify specific countries for targeting, but when discussing the possible use of nuclear weapons, military officials for years have deliberately left vague the type of response and the potential targets they could strike.

The research council report, written by Hans Kristensen, a nuclear arms specialist and consultant for the organization, relies on recently declassified documents, commercial satellite imagery and other documents. The report challenges the rationale for keeping short-range weapons in Europe when America has thousands of long-range missiles that could hit any target in minutes.

"Clinging to a cold war nuclear posture impedes NATO's transition to a modern alliance and drains scarce resources that the alliance urgently needs to fulfill real-world non-nuclear missions," the report concludes.

Source: Eric Schmitt The New York Times.Wednesday, February 9, 2005

News from United Nations - New York:

European countries vote divided on New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament

Click here for NAC Resolution NAC (.pdf, 105k)

Click here for Votes (.pdf, 381k)

On October 28 2004, the UN First Committee adopted the resolution sponsored by the New Agenda Coalition, entitled "Accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments".

The adopted New Agenda Resolution in 2004 is short and innocuously worded with the purpose of providing a constructive context and garnering maximum support in the run-up to the 2005 NPT Review Conference. It recalls the unequivocal undertaking given by the Nuclear Weapon States to eliminate nuclear weapons at the 2000 Review Conference, while also noting that the ultimate objective of the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective control. In only 8 operative paragraphs, the resolution calls on all states to "fully comply with commitments made regarding nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and not to act in any way that may be detrimental to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation or that may lead to a new nuclear arms race". States were also called on to "accelerate the implementation" of the practical steps for nuclear disarmament agreed in 2000 and to resume fissban negotiations in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament on the basis of the 1995 (Shannon) Mandate.

The principles of irreversibility and transparency, as well as verification, were underlined as "imperative", and the resolution called for the CD to establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament. Although the NAC did not sponsor a separate resolution this year on non-strategic nuclear weapons, they called on the NWS "to take further steps to reduce their non-strategic nuclear arsenals and not to develop new types of nuclear weapons, in accordance with their commitment to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies."

The resolution was adopted with 135 YES - 5 NO - 25 ABSTENTION.

Voting against were United Kingdom, US, France, Israel and Latvia. Abstainers included Russia, Spain, Portugal, Australia, India, Italy, Iceland, Denmark, Poland, Slovenia and Hungary and a number of other former Eastern-bloc new NATO members or applicants. China and Pakistan both voted in favour, as did most of the NAM, although some were concerned that the resolution had been diluted or weakened too far. Of particular importance, a number of NATO states braved US displeasure - which had been forcefully conveyed at meetings here in New York and demarchés in capitals - to vote in favour. These were: Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Luxembourg and Turkey. It was also noted that Japan this year voted in favour of the NAC resolution, as did South Korea.

Other important nuclear disarmament resolutions were L.23, from Japan, entitled "A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons", as well as Malaysia's resolution (L.39) calling for a nuclear weapon convention, which is titled "Follow up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons".

Most of the remaining resolutions dealt with disarmament machinery (the UNDC, CD, more regional centres, strenthening cooperation and so on), and adopted without a vote. Though not all were uncontroversial, they will be covered in a later update. Due to other work commitments, this is just a preliminary report to provide voting figures on the three controversial nuclear weapons-related resolutions. The explanations given for the votes will be provided over the weekend, with fuller analysis in my final report.

Japan's traditional nuclear disarmament resolution supporting the NPT was long and detailed. It supported the agreements adopted in 2000 and described the 13 steps (but with some alterations, accounting for some of the abstentions). It was resoundingly adopted by 151 votes, with 2 opposed (India and the United States) and 16 abstentions (which included the NAC, China, India, Israel, Pakistan, Iran, Bhutan, Malta, Cuba, Myanmar (Burma) and DPRK). Once again, the principal reason for the US opposition to its ally's moderate, NPT-reinforcing resolution was Japan's call for early entry into force of the CTBT and for a verifiable fissile material ban.

Malaysia's resolution on the advisory opinion of the ICJ, which has been annual since 1996, received an overall vote of 118 to 28 with 21 abstentions. As in past years, a separate vote was called on OP1, which "underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmaemnt in all its aspects under strict and effective international control". This received overwhelming support from 156 states, with 3 against and 5 abstentions. Israel, Russia and the United States voted against. The abstainers were: Britain, France, Belarus, Latvia and Uzbekistan.

Source: Rebecca Johnson - Acronym Institute

More details on First Committee resolutions and votes:

Acronym Institute

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