

An International Conference

# **A Comprehensive Approach towards Nuclear Disarmament”**

Thursday 19 April 2007

European Parliament, Brussels

Organised by


*Abolition 2000 Europe, ISIS Europe,*

*Mayors for Peace, Olof Palme*

*International Center and the*

*Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament*


The global choice



Global  
commitment to  
disarmament &  
non-proliferation

Further  
proliferation...  
increasingly  
unstable

Sitting on the fence is no longer an option  
Disarmament is the key



## **"A Comprehensive Approach towards Nuclear Disarmament"**

**A Conference organized by Abolition 2000 Europe, ISIS Europe, Mayors for Peace, Olof Palme International Center and the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament.**

European Parliament April 19th 2007 Brussels

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On Thursday April 19th, members of the European Parliament from across the political spectrum joined with disarmament experts, political leaders and civil society representatives in a conference "A Comprehensive approach towards nuclear disarmament".

The conference explored the possibilities and opportunities for the European Union to become increasingly involved in promoting non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. This conference was very timely in as it took place during the run-up to the next Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee from April 30 to May 11 2007.

The recent nuclear test by North-Korea as well as the nuclear weapons modernisation programs of the Nuclear-Weapon States are deeply disturbing events. Today nine countries have nuclear weapons compared to six just 10 years ago. On October 16th 2006 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, declared that a new approach was necessary as another 20 or 30 nations have the capacity to develop nuclear weapons in a very short time span. ElBaradei underscored this by saying: *"It is difficult to maintain the logic that for some countries reliance would be made on nuclear weapons or even trying to develop new nuclear weapons while telling everybody else that is not good for you"*.

In response to this mounting peril *Mayors for Peace*, other global associations, and private citizens are now working together to promote the *2020 Vision Campaign*. The purpose of this campaign is to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

The organizers and participants paid tribute to the work and lifetime achievements of the Mayor of Nagasaki, Mr. Iccho Itoh. He was the co-founder of *Mayors for Peace* and Chair of the Japanese association of *Mayors for Peace*. He was brutally assassinated on April 18th 2007 in his home town of Nagasaki, the second city to have experienced a nuclear attack. We also paid tribute to nuclear abolition campaigner Janet Bloomfield, co-founder of the *Atomic Mirror* and a leader in the *Abolition 2000* global network to abolish nuclear arms, who had died unexpectedly the previous week.

**PRESENTATION BY MARILYN NEVEN FOR JEAN-LUC DEHAENE MEP**

*Jean-Luc Dehaene MEP is Chair of the Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats). He was formerly a Prime Minister of Belgium. Marilyn Neven is an assistant to Jean- Dehaene.*

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*Jean-Luc Dehaene regrets very much not being able to join you today for this important discussion. Unfortunately he needed to leave earlier for an obligation abroad, and apologises to all the participants.*

"I would like to reiterate my support for the efforts of numerous organisations all over the world in this fight - a couple of which I am member of myself. The only possibility of meeting the challenge is a step by step approach, involving as many people and politicians as possible throughout the world, and increasing pressure. It needs time, but it works.



I have a special appreciation for the *Mayors for Peace* and I believe in the potential of this world alliance of cities. Having been informed of the tragic crime on 17th April, I would like to pay tribute to Mayor Iccho Itoh, Mayor of Nagasaki and vice president of Mayors for Peace. The mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki called, with remarkable success, on mayors throughout the world to stand up for nuclear disarmament. Today, I am happy that among the more than one thousand six hundred member cities, quite a few are Belgian. I thank Mayor Icco Itoh for his achievements. Good luck to PNND, its members, and all the people who are going to great lengths to support this growing network.



Europe can and must play a special role in seeking compliance with Article VI of the NPT. There is backing from the International Court of Justice. And there is backing from the European citizens too. A leading role for Europe in *diplomatic nuclear disarmament* is one of the few issues on which EU citizens do more or less do agree. I hope for a creative discussion today, giving new incentives to Europe's decision-makers and diplomats.

## ANA GOMES

*Anna Gomes is the Vice-chair of the Sub-Committee on Security and Defence in the European Parliament and a member of the Socialist (PSE) group in the European Parliament.*

Let me start by welcoming everyone to the European Parliament. It is a pleasure and an honour for this institution to host today's event.

This initiative is a good example of how the European Parliament and civil society organisations can join forces to tackle some of the most difficult issues of our time. A dynamic 'coalition of the willing' got together and made this conference possible: they are *Abolition 2000*, *ISIS Europe*, *Mayors for Peace*, the *Olof Palme International Center* and the *Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament*.



Since most of you will have the opportunity in the next few hours to hear specialists from all over the world addressing in depth such issues as the EU's role in the ongoing struggle to save and strengthen the NPT, the proper balance between non-proliferation and disarmament, and the way ahead for nuclear disarmament, I will limit myself to a brief overview of these topics.

A few days from the 2007 Preparatory Committee the mood is far from optimistic. The NPT, together with multilateralism as a whole, has suffered tremendous blows from all sides since 2000, and it remains to be seen whether we are starting to see light at the end of the tunnel - the Preparatory Committee will be a good test.

In November 2006, Kofi Annan held a memorable, and much-quoted, speech about nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament at Princeton University. He described the lack of progress - "*mutually assured paralysis*" has replaced "*mutually assured destruction*." He emphasized that "*we are asleep at the controls of a fast-moving aircraft*" and that "*unless we wake up and take control, the outcome is all too predictable*."

But what was most inspiring in the former Secretary-General's speech was his plea not to let the essential bargain at the core of the NPT be hijacked by the debate between 'disarmament-first', or 'non-proliferation-first' approaches: Kofi Annan was right when he said that this polarization is "*sterile, counterproductive, and based on false dichotomies*."

What does this mean in practice?

It means that the NPT needs to be put back into the centre of international discourse about nuclear weapons: in the same way that Iran, North Korea, or anybody else, must not be allowed to legitimize their own nuclear adventures by hiding behind the unwillingness of the Nuclear-Weapon States to fulfil their disarmament commitments, the P-5 cannot go on pretending that as long as there are threats to their security and nuclear proliferation, their own nukes are untouchable.

Or, in other words, and quoting Kofi Annan, while "*lack of progress on disarmament is no excuse for not addressing the dangers of proliferation*", "*it would be much easier to confront proliferators, if the very existence of nuclear weapons was universally acknowledged as dangerous and ultimately illegitimate*."

I don't see this conference as an effort to downplay the danger of nuclear proliferation, to consider it secondary to disarmament, or to portray it as a "*problem of the nuclear haves*". I see it rather as an opportunity to move the debate about nuclear weapons away from an approach based on threat perceptions and geo-political and strategic considerations alone, and back to where it really belongs: to the legal framework of the NPT, and to the ultimate purpose of the "*general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control*", as Article VI of the NPT puts it.

The annoying thing is that we know exactly what to do and which practical steps we have to take to gradually turn this utopian-sounding goal into reality. The '13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament' were agreed to as recently as in 2000 and they list unilateral and multilateral initiatives that can move us all closer to the ultimate goal of a nuclear weapons-free world.

To the '13 steps', we could add another idea that is immediately relevant: spreading a web of negative security assurances shielding Non-Nuclear Weapon States from nuclear threats and maybe even anchor these assurances in a treaty.

The point of gradual nuclear disarmament cannot be to just *reduce* the nuclear arsenals at the disposal of the states holding them: for example, during the short and shallow debate about the update and renewal of the Trident system, the Blair government boasted that the UK had cut its nuclear weapons explosive capacity by 70% since the end of the Cold War and drastically reduced the level of readiness of its remaining nuclear arsenal. It also pledged to cut the number of operational warheads by 20% to below 160 - a mere trifle, they say...

But what became clear from the statements made by the Prime Minister, his putative successor and their Tory allies, was that nuclear weapons are to remain *at the heart* of the UK's defence doctrine for another generation, in a clear indication that the commitments made at the 2000 Review Conference are dead and buried, at least what London is concerned.

In other words, how can the Nuclear-Weapon States expect to be taken seriously when they claim credit for having done the obvious (reducing their massive and useless arsenals after the end of the Cold War to a 'mere' 12,000 actively deployed nuclear weapons), while at the same time avoiding their legal obligation to plan for long-term disarmament.

What is now necessary and urgent is to follow up on the quantitative reduction of arsenals with a qualitative, doctrinal rethinking of the role of nuclear weapons in the 21st century, because - quite apart from the powerful ethical and legal arguments against these weapons, what justifies their use, either passively, or actively?.

Let us take a quick look at the European Security Strategy and the main threats Europe is facing at the moment (which are global threats indeed): terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional instability, failed states and organized crime - there isn't one, NOT ONE, of these threats that can be counteracted by a nuclear arsenal - besides immoral and on the long run, illegal, these weapons are useless.

In this particular field - the fundamental rethinking of the need for nukes - we have gone backwards, with the Bush administration leading the drive for a new doctrine lowering the operational threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, while at the same time developing smaller, and more 'useable' nuclear weapons. The only good news came from Congress, which saved the US from itself when it cut funding to the bunker-buster programme...

In short, with the US in a deep crisis about their place in the world, and the EU a hostage to the nuclear posturing of France and the UK, wise leadership and effective multilateralism in the field of nuclear disarmament have been in short supply in the last few years.

In the European Parliament, we try hard to pass resolutions that accurately reflect what we feel is the real European consensus about nuclear disarmament. In the EP's resolution of 14 March 2007 on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, we urged (and I quote):

*"the Council Presidency to promote at the NTP Preparatory Committee a number of disarmament initiatives based on the 'Principles and objectives of Nuclear Non-Proliferations and Disarmament' agreed upon at the 1995 NPT Review Conference and the '13 Practical Steps' agreed unanimously at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which must be improved upon and implemented in order to make progress and to avoid regress or standstill."*

Unfortunately, the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy does not cover member states' nuclear policies and that is why there is a *fundamental imbalance in the EU's role in the world in this field*.

Let me explain: on one hand, the birth of an 'EU Strategy against the Proliferation of WMD' in December 2003 and the appointment of Annalisa Giannella as Solana's Personal Representative on non-proliferation of WMD are welcome steps and the EU is playing a fundamental role in strengthening the IAEA, supporting the CTBTO Preparatory Committee and promoting the universalisation of the NPT.

But as long as this European Strategy is only turned outwards, as long as disarmament is only to be pursued outside the borders of the Union, in other words, as long as London and Paris continue to see this Strategy as something that doesn't concern their own nuclear arsenals, the EU will continue to be a flawed defender of the NPT and it will continue to fight non-proliferation with one hand tied behind its back.

Global leadership in this as in other fields comes at a price: and Europe doesn't seem to be willing to pay that price just yet.

You will of course hear more about the role of the EU in the implementation of the NPT in a few hours.

## GARETH EVANS

### THE BLIX COMMISSION'S WAKE-UP CALL: MEETING THE NUCLEAR CHALLENGE

*Gareth Evans is President of the International Crisis Group, and a member of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission.*

In January this year the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists' Doomsday Clock, for six decades now the best-known symbolic indicator of the threat posed by nuclear proliferation, moved two minutes closer to midnight – at 11.55 the closest to doomsday it has been since the Cold War.



At the start of the nuclear arms race in 1953 the clock's hands were set at two minutes to midnight. Under President Bush senior, with the end of the Cold War and after the US and Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 1991, the clock moved the farthest from doomsday it has ever been, to 11.43.

Now, under his son's watch, the hands of the clock have been pushed back almost as close to midnight as they have ever been – with the renewed value being attached to the possession of nuclear weapons by so many countries; with the CTBT in limbo and the NPT being steadily eroded; with North Korea's bomb test and Iran's nuclear plans; with the deal with India unaccompanied by any serious discipline on fissile material production or anything else; with the continuing talk about the development of new generations weapons; with the emergence of talk – almost unthinkable in the Cold War years – of nuclear weapons being an acceptable means of war-fighting, even to the extent of their use in pre-emptive strikes; and with the new anxiety felt about non-state actors, combined with old fears continuing about poor safeguards of nuclear materials.

There is no reason for Europeans to feel any sense of smug complacency about any of this, that it's all about the current US administration and nothing to do with *us*. Neither of the two EU Nuclear-Weapon States have done anything to persuade the non-nuclear weapons states that they are in the slightest bit serious about meeting their own side of the grand NPT bargain – to move steadily toward absolute nuclear disarmament.

The UK Government's determination to proceed with the replacement of the Trident system is as clear, and depressing, an example as will even find of the way in which low political calculation will always trump high principle, short term advantage will always out-manoeuvre long-term gain, and perceived national interest will just about always triumph over obvious global interest. And so far as France is concerned there is an Academy Award on offer for anyone able to assert with a straight face that any of this week's presidential candidates would in office be any more willing than their UK counterparts to unilaterally abandon or weaken their *own* country's position in the double-standard game of charades being played by the Nuclear-Weapon States.

This is the background which led to the creation by Hans Blix and the Swedish Government of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission in 2003. No-one emerged with more credit from the Iraq debacle of that year than Hans Blix, and he had no difficulty in either pulling together a team of highly experienced

commissioners from all corners of the globe, or - after more than two years of debate and argument and consultations and hearings all round the world – extracting from his members a hard-hitting and completely unanimous report, published last year, which I believe is the most accessible available compilation of the issues, and the most succinct guide to the action which now needs to be taken.

The report's title is stark - *Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms* - and its messages are straightforward, beginning with:

### **Why action is necessary**

Nuclear, biological and chemical arms are the most inhumane of all weapons. And nuclear weapons are the most inhumane of all. Designed to terrify as well as destroy, they are capable, in the hands of either states or non-state actors, of destruction on a vastly greater scale than any conventional weapons, and their impact is far more indiscriminate and long lasting.

Notwithstanding the end of the Cold War balance of terror, stocks of such weapons remain extraordinarily and alarmingly high: some 30,000 in the case of nuclear weapons, of which around 12,000 are still actively deployed.

Over the last decade, there has been a serious, and dangerous, loss of momentum and direction in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. Treaty making and implementation has stalled and, as a new wave of proliferation has threatened, unilateral enforcement action has been increasingly advocated.

2005 saw two loud wake-up calls in the failure of the NPT Review Conference, and the inability of the World Summit to agree on a single line about any WMD issue. It is critical for those calls to be heeded now.

**So what is to be done?** The Commission's recommendations are grouped into four sets, with some overlap inevitable because of the inter-linkages that clearly exist between the issues of arsenal security, non-proliferation and disarmament, but the basic messages all very clear.

### **First, agree on general principles of action**

The Commission spells them out:

- Disarmament and non-proliferation are best pursued through a cooperative rules-based international order, applied and enforced through effective multilateral institutions, with the UN Security Council as the ultimate global authority;
- There is an urgent need (bearing in mind that the CD in Geneva has spent ten years failing to agree even on agenda for future talks) to revive meaningful negotiations, through all available intergovernmental mechanisms, on the three main objectives of reducing the danger of present arsenals, preventing proliferation, and outlawing all weapons of destruction once and for all;
- States, individually and collectively, should consistently pursue policies designed to ensure that no state feels a need to acquire weapons of mass destruction;
- Governments and relevant intergovernmental organizations and non-government actors should commence preparations for a World Summit on disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction to generate new momentum for concerted international action.



## **Second, reduce the danger of present arsenals:**

The Commission's mantra here is 'no use by states – no access by terrorists'. And what that means in policy terms is:

- Secure all weapons of mass destruction and all WMD-related material and equipment from theft or other acquisition by terrorists;
- Take nuclear weapons off high-alert status to reduce the risk of launching by error; make deep reductions in strategic nuclear weapons; place all non-strategic nuclear weapons in centralized storage; and withdraw all such weapons from foreign soil;
- Prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and phase out the production of highly-enriched uranium;
- Diminish the role of nuclear weapons by no-first-use pledges, assurances not to use them against non-nuclear weapons states, and by not developing nuclear weapons for new tasks.

## **Third, prevent proliferation.**

That means both vertical proliferation (no new weapons systems) and horizontal proliferation (no new possessors), to be achieved by the following policy approaches:

- Prohibit any nuclear weapons tests by bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force;
- Revive the fundamental commitments of all NPT parties: the five nuclear weapon states parties to negotiate towards nuclear disarmament and the non-nuclear weapon states to refrain from developing nuclear weapons;
- Recognize that countries not party to the NPT also have a duty to participate in the disarmament process;
- Continue negotiations with Iran and North Korea to achieve their effective and verified rejection of nuclear weapons, while assuring their security and acknowledging the right of all NPT parties to peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
- Explore international arrangements for an assurance of supply of enriched uranium fuel, and for the disposal of spent fuel, to reduce incentives for national facilities and diminish proliferation risks.

The Blix Commission was not unconscious of the argument that the 'atoms for peace' principle is unsustainable, and that civil nuclear energy production (whatever its superficial attractions in an age of anxiety about the contribution of fossil fuels to global warming) inevitably will reinforce and make ever harder to control the move toward wider nuclear weapons possession.

But we felt that recognizing and accommodating the demand for civilian nuclear capability was the only possible way the NPT could be held together – and, as it must be, strengthened – in the present environment, and that it would be Quixotic in the extreme to tilt at this windmill while trying to hold together a broad based international consensus in favour of drawing an absolute red line against anything in the nature of weaponisation.

Of course the optimal solution all round (except for those who not prepared to support any role for any kind of civil nuclear energy) would be for all fissile material production, and all spent fuel disposal, to be internationalized and fully controlled so as to make impossible any diversion for weapons production purposes. But it is hard to get that aspiration even to first base while some countries – notably the US – refuse to even contemplate the internationalization of their own processes.

**Fourth, work toward outlawing all weapons of mass destruction once and for all.**

This is unquestionably the hardest part of the equation to operationalise, but without serious attempts to move down this track, it is hopeless to contemplate holding the non-proliferation line against further erosion. All the world hates a hypocrite, and there is no area of international public policy where double standards are more obvious than in relation to the NPT, and the requirement in Article VI that the existing nuclear weapons states commit to disarmament.

The Blix Commission argues that all states should:

- Accept the principle that nuclear weapons should be outlawed, just as biological and chemical weapons are, and explore the political, legal, technical and procedural options for achieving this within a reasonable time;
- Complete the implementation of existing regional Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones and work actively to establish zones free from WMD in other regions, particularly and most urgently in the Middle East.

It also argued strongly – and this has been reinforced by China’s recent experiment in shooting down a satellite - that there should be an absolute prohibition on the stationing or use of weapons in outer space.

There is one particular message that runs like a constant refrain through the Blix Commission Report, as it did through the report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons which preceded it ten years ago, and first formulated this language, viz:

*So long as any state has nuclear weapons others will want them. So long as any such weapons remain, there is a high risk that they will one day be used, by design or accident. And any such use would be catastrophic.*

There are a lot of complexities and technicalities in the nuclear debate, and all too many policy makers, like all too many members of the public, throw up their hands and say it’s all just too complicated. But there are not many messages in public life that are simpler than that one.

And so too is the Commission’s answer to the endlessly recurring argument that it is pointless talking about the elimination of nuclear weapons because they cannot be uninvented:

*Weapons of mass destruction cannot be uninvented. But they can be outlawed, as biological and chemical weapons already have been, and their use made unthinkable. Compliance, verification and enforcement rules can, with the requisite will, be effectively applied. And with that will, even the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is not beyond the world’s reach.*

That’s a very simple couple of messages. It’s time that they were heard, time that they were acted upon, and time – here as elsewhere – that Europe, instead of hiding behind everyone else’s skirts, takes a lead in ensuring just that.

## **GIRTS KRISTOVSKIS MEP**

*Girts Kristovskis is a member of the Union for Europe of the Nations group in the European Parliament and European Parliamentary Rapporteur on Weapons of Mass Destruction.*

It is a privilege for me to be here and to exchange thoughts with you about this subject.

I have been the rapporteur on Weapons of Mass Destruction which related to the role of the European Parliament. Currently I am a representative of one of the new member- states, Latvia. Previously I served as Minister of Defence for five and a half years and Minister of the Interior for one and a half years. My background may therefore help me to evaluate this subject – or it may be a hindrance.

Prioritising is a problem and it must be asked which is the more important: disarmament or non-proliferation? As members of the European Parliament become better acquainted with each other, I acknowledge that we hold different positions in some areas. But as a community everyone has an overall understanding of the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation. However, even after two years, there is some scepticism on the part of the new member-states and these states do not have many representatives here today.

Let us consider some basic problems which we must understand if we want to promote disarmament and gain support from the new member-states of the European Union. The EU is very diverse, consisting of Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States. These have different strategies and tactics, creating insecurity.

I believe we should aim for a world free from nuclear weapons. When the Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed in 1967 I was five years old and I knew from my family that it was a very threatening period in a bi-polar world. My parents told me that we would have a nuclear war. Prior to this meeting I found out that practically every United States President has been very supportive of disarmament. Recently Mr Schultz, Mr Kissinger, and William Perry wrote to the *Wall Street Journal* calling for nuclear disarmament. I questioned this letter. As US Secretary of Defense one is in charge of a huge arsenal of weapons intended for attack or deterrence. One promotes and develops nuclear strategy. But when one is no longer the Defense Secretary one can become more assertive in promoting nuclear disarmament, showing that the pressure of responsibility affects people in different ways as their political life changes. Our concern is the question of how far we can engage with these people. Perhaps those people whose job it is to represent a pro-nuclear approach are more inclined, in their hearts, to be anti-nuclear, and are willing to support disarmament as time goes on.

One can question why there is so much scepticism about disarmament among the new EU member-states. It is because they still bear in mind the bi-polar world of the recent past. The Nuclear Weapon States still retain considerable stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Russian democracy has gone into reverse. We are fearful of Russian policy which, after all, has an effect in our part of the world. This is why the new EU states are very supportive of the US in their foreign policy even though the US emphasises the need for weapons of mass destruction in its security policy.

We must always be ready to learn. During my time as Latvian Minister of Defence,

we were requested to join the Iraq War Coalition. At that time Latvia was a candidate state for the EU and was even involved in the exchange of information and intelligence. So in practice there was no real choice. We also had to decide whether or not to join NATO and this meant explaining to our Parliament what price we had to pay for membership of these international institutions.

However, it is now much easier for me to speak about these matters. Before the invasion of Iraq the information from the Security Council and the presentation at the UN by the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, suggested that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and the materials to make more. We were told that Iraq could soon create nuclear weapons and was an imminent threat. In essence we were being asked to defend the democratic world. I believed that this threat really existed as the US had provided me, as Minister of Defence, with no other information. It was my responsibility to question this information. The media questioned whether or not I believed it, and I replied that I must trust a state which had the strongest intelligence service in the world and whose service members I had met. I had opportunities to listen to them many times and I had to trust them. Therefore it came as a shock later to read all the articles which claimed that the intelligence services were put under pressure.

It is now time to learn the lessons of the past. We live in a new era when it is possible to take action. When I became a Member of the European Parliament and was appointed as rapporteur on weapons of mass destruction, I began to understand what people in the old European states know about the subject, how deeply they shared their views on the issue, and in what detail. Due to their past experience few of the citizens of the new member-states are ready to really engage with the situation.

After a year and a half as rapporteur I am still learning a great deal, which is why I agreed to participate in this conference. It strongly stimulates me to deepen my knowledge and to bring the message to our own societies. It is valuable to understand why in Sweden and Spain, for example, the approach is different. I believe the European Parliament is trying to become more involved. We are vastly improving our ability to develop a policy on weapons of mass destruction and on non-proliferation. A great deal of information is now exchanged and members try to identify which initiatives the European Union and other international institutions should develop.

During the last discussion in Parliament a resolution was tabled about the need for the European Parliament to be part of EU delegation for the NPT Preparatory Committee. This is important as it creates an opportunity for parliamentarians to gain personal experience and to exchange views with the people directly involved in the NPT monitoring and decision-making process, as well as with members of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the EU Commission, and the G8 dialogue.

In conclusion, I am both concerned and optimistic at the same time. The EU really promotes some non-proliferation strategies. The disarmament aspect may still be lagging behind but non-proliferation is also important because it provides an opportunity to study and use all the international instruments and the EU documents. It means that the EU can become a stronger player. The US may be sceptical about our proceedings, but we are steadily coming closer to agreement on how to resolve these problems. We must continue to do our best in the European Parliament.

## LENA HJELM-WALLÉN

*Lena Hjelm-Wallén is the ex-foreign Affairs Minister of Sweden  
and President of the Olof Palme International Center.*

We must maintain our work in building up engaged public opinion regarding nuclear weapons. That is why I am very grateful to the organisers of this conference. I am convinced that Members of the European Parliament can contribute a great deal to the demand for nuclear disarmament.



Nuclear weapons are not prominent in the media. Neither do they arouse the interest of political leaders except when there are warnings that a terror group or a “rogue” state might get these weapons. However, nuclear weapons are a threat wherever they exist and whoever possesses them. Any leader of a state with nuclear weapons can push the button and destroy large areas of the world and even start a war that will leave nothing behind. Of course, the threats are not the same today as during the Cold War. The risk of a total nuclear war is very small today. But the risk of limited use, or use of one single nuclear warhead, is now considerably greater than ever.

The awareness of how dangerous nuclear weapons are resulted in disarmament negotiations some decades ago with important results such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other agreements. But during recent years this positive trend has changed into a negative one. India and Pakistan have conducted nuclear test explosions and declared that they possess nuclear weapons. For the past nine years negotiations in Conference on Disarmament in Geneva have been non-productive.

The NPT Review Conference in 2000 had an important result - the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament. But in 2005 the Review Conference failed to adopt any substantial final resolution, mainly due to the USA’s opposition. The UN Millennium Review Summit of September 2005 saw the same dismal result – no progress at all in the field of disarmament.

The lack of compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty is very serious. Under Article VI of this treaty the five recognised Nuclear-Weapon States undertook to disarm, and in the long term to abolish, their nuclear weapons in return for other states refraining from obtaining such weapons.

I can see three main reasons for the NPT’s crisis.

1. No disarmament at all has taken place in the two states which have the most nuclear weapons – the USA and Russia – since the Moscow Agreement in 2002. This undermines the entire balance of the NPT. If those who have the largest nuclear arsenals refuse to meet their commitments to nuclear disarmament under Article VI, why should those who feel less secure think any differently?
2. There is a tendency, above all in Russia and the USA, but also in other countries with nuclear arms, to assign a new political and military role to nuclear weapons. Russia has developed new nuclear weapon carriers and the US wants to carry out research on mini-nuclear weapons and so-called “earth penetrators”. And now we have the regrettable British decision about the Trident programme – a new generation of submarines carrying nuclear warheads.

3. Nuclear weapons have now spread to more than the five recognised states. India and Pakistan have them and almost certainly Israel. North Korea says it has nuclear weapons and Iran wants the world to believe that it is capable of developing nuclear weapons, as witnessed in its obstructive attitude towards the UN Security Council and IAEA. Non-governmental actors, who might be able to use nuclear weapons, are now better organised with stronger resources. There are also actors who are prepared to sell nuclear arms technology for profit. The threat of proliferation has become greater.

I would like to mention an initiative taken by the Swedish Government in 1998 when I was Minister for Foreign Affairs; the *New Agenda Coalition* (NAC). This initiative has subsequently played a role in United Nations disarmament discussions. The initiative was supported by the governments of Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Egypt, New Zealand and Ireland. This support has grown in the annual votes on NAC resolutions in the UN General Assembly. Only five countries – the USA, France, the United Kingdom, India and Israel - voted against this resolution during the last General Assembly. 153 countries voted in favour and 20 countries abstained. It is particularly gratifying that the number of NATO countries, Germany among them, supporting the resolution has continued to increase.

Many countries have had nuclear weapons, or been on the threshold of obtaining them only to conclude that they will be safer without them and acceding to the NPT. They have a moral responsibility and a special political credibility. I hope that these countries would be willing to use their position and experience to add new energy to the 1998 NAC initiative. Among them are NATO countries such as Germany and Canada. Japan and former Soviet republics such as Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan could also take part.

Such a group of countries could create a new dynamic and reconcile some of the deadlocks. Not least, it is important to address the NATO states that do not have nuclear weapons and encourage them to follow their undertakings under the NPT by encouraging the Alliance to relinquish its remaining dependence on nuclear weapons in its strategic doctrine. As I am here in the European Parliament I would like to stress that the efforts to develop Europe into a nuclear-free zone must continue.

Public opinion is of utmost importance and must be strengthened. Major popular movements such as political parties, trade unions and churches should again place disarmament higher on their agendas.

Above all, what is needed is a renewed political will, supported by a breakthrough in disarmament negotiations. This should involve concrete measures and a return to multilateralism. Countries opposing disarmament should re-think their position and renounce their dependence on nuclear weapons in their security doctrines.

There is still only one defence against nuclear weapons; and that is their total elimination with a global structure to ensure compliance, as envisaged in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The final goal is a world in which all nuclear weapons have been eliminated: They are not the answer. Nuclear weapons are militarily unusable. In reality they are only political weapons. But nevertheless they are lethally dangerous. That is why the fight against these weapons must be carried on as long as they exist.

## ALYN WARE

### THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTARIANS

*Alyn Ware is the Global Coordinator of the  
Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament*

I'd like to open by paying tribute to two wonderful people who were dedicated advocates for peace and the abolition of nuclear weapons and who passed away recently. I'd like to honour Iccho Itoh, Mayor of Nagasaki, President of the Japan Association of Nuclear Free Local Authorities and the Vice- President of Mayors for Peace, who was shot and killed earlier this week as he was campaigning for re-election Mayor Itoh worked closely with the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament building collaborative efforts of mayors and parliamentarians in the quest for a nuclear weapons-free world.



I would also like to honour Janet Bloomfield, Co-Director of Atomic Mirror, former Chair of Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the United Kingdom and one of the founders of Abolition 2000, the international network of over 2000 organisations calling for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons through a global nuclear weapons convention – or treaty. Janet passed away suddenly last week. A number of people who might otherwise have been here are attending her funeral today.

I apologise if this is a rather sombre note on which to start my presentation. Both Mayor Itoh and Janet were seriously dedicated to nuclear abolition, but also they both had a great sense of humour, hope and humanity in their work. In our considerations today may we also mix a seriousness about the importance of our task – to rid the world of the threat of nuclear weapons – with a sense of optimism and some good fun.

The 40th anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (the Latin American NWFZ Treaty) was held in Mexico on February 14th. In the US this is also Valentines Day – a day to celebrate romance So Janet's organization Atomic Mirror 'romanced' the delegates with chocolates and Valentines Day cards, and invited the rest of the world to send NWFZ Valentines cards over the year 2007 – 2008 as a stepping stone towards a nuclear weapons-free world. In a time when it is hard to get media and public attention on the vital issue of nuclear threats, such fun and innovative activities are.

But to return to the serious nature of the topic for this session – the international context, the current state of play of the NPT and the role of parliamentarians – let me start with a couple of recent developments.

Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in one of his final major speeches before retiring from office, said the greatest danger requiring action is that of nuclear weapons. *“Even a single bomb can destroy an entire city, as we know from the terrible example of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and today, there are bombs many times as powerful as those. These weapons pose a unique threat to humanity as a whole.”*

Annan criticized countries for talking this issue selectively and from two polarized paths. One of these is promoted by the ‘*non-proliferation first*’ advocates (including the nuclear weapon possessing states) who take no action on their own stockpiles but attempt to prevent anyone else from acquiring nuclear weapons. The other path pursued by the ‘*disarmament first*’ advocates who are hesitant to support stronger non-proliferation measures while the NWS make no progress on disarmament.

Annan expressed concern that because of inaction, the world is not only *“sleepwalking towards disaster. In truth, it is worse than that – we are asleep at the controls of a fast-moving aircraft. Unless we wake up and take control, the outcome is all too predictable.”*

On January 17 the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moved the hands of their Doomsday Clock closer to midnight. The Clock indicates, in the view of eminent scientists, how close we are to a catastrophe that could destroy civilization. It now stands at 5 minutes to midnight.

The move was made because of the growing risks from climate change and a growing threat from nuclear weapons including North Korea joining the nuclear club, Iran possibly on its way to doing so, an increased readiness by existing nuclear weapon powers to use nuclear weapons, and an increased propensity to use military force to deal with nuclear proliferation issues.

Mathematician Stephen Hawking, at the press conference announcing the Doomsday Clock change, noted; *“As scientists, we understand the dangers of nuclear weapons and their devastating effect, and we are learning how human activities and technologies are affecting climate systems in ways that may forever change life on Earth. As citizens of the world, we have a duty to alert the public to the unnecessary risks that we live with every day, and to the perils we foresee if governments and societies do not take action now to render nuclear weapons obsolete and to prevent further climate change.”*

This move provides an opportunity for parliamentarians to act on the more general aspect of nuclear dangers and the need for action towards a nuclear weapons-free world. UK MP Dai Davies and 27 other MPs, for example, followed-up the Bulletin announcement with an Early Day Motion highlighting the Doomsday Clock and concluding that *“the retention of British nuclear weapons of mass destruction further exacerbates the global security problem.”*

On January 4 this year US conservative leaders George Schultz (Secretary of State under Ronald Reagan) and Henry Kissinger (Secretary of State under Richard Nixon) joined moderates William Perry (Secretary of Defense under Bill Clinton) and Sam Nunn (Former Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee) in a call to end nuclear deterrence and pave the way for a nuclear weapons-free world.

In an editorial entitled [A World Free of Nuclear Weapons](#), published by the Wall Street Journal, the men asserted that *“Nuclear weapons were essential to maintaining international security during the Cold War because they were a means of*



*deterrence,” but that “reliance on, nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective.”*

They called on US leaders to envision how to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world and that *“Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons would be a bold initiative consistent with America's moral heritage.”*

Public opinion in the United States, other Nuclear-Weapon States, and indeed all over the world, has favoured nuclear abolition for some time now. Opinion polls in the US, UK, France, Japan, India, Belgium, Germany, Norway, Russia and more have indicated public support for nuclear abolition and a nuclear weapons convention at 75% or above. But the political leadership in Nuclear Weapon States and their allies has dragged behind this sentiment, erring towards the so-called realist perspective (which could be more accurately described as a defeatist perspective) that nuclear disarmament is desirable but not possible in the current political context.

The Doomsday Clock move indicates the danger in this approach. The Wall Street Journal article calls for a visionary problem-solving approach to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world, rather than a defeatist approach accepting the status quo. Some other recent initiatives give substance to this problem solving approach. The Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction, chaired by Hans Blix, studied the issue of nuclear weapons along with biological and chemical weapons, and came up with a number of practical measures that could be taken now to move the world towards nuclear abolition.

A consortium of lawyers, scientists and disarmament experts went further and drafted a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention in 1997 outlining the legal, technical and political elements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear weapons-free world. This Model NWC has recently been updated and will be re-released on April 30 at the NPT Prep Com, along with the book *Securing our Survival: The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention*.

So where does the NPT fit in these developments? Is it a useful forum for ensuring a balanced and effective approach to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament or is it seriously flawed? I would say a bit of both.

The NPT contains a core bargain on non-proliferation and disarmament that reflects a basic reality, i.e. that you cannot expect states to indefinitely restrain themselves from acquiring nuclear weapons if other states retain the right to possess them indefinitely. Thus, the NPT requires both non-proliferation and disarmament. The bargain is a good one. The problem is in selective implementation and the lack of teeth in the NPT to enforce implementation of the disarmament obligation.

Thus, we should continue to highlight the NPT and its joint obligations of non-proliferation and disarmament. We should be there at the meetings to challenge states to implement both sides of the bargain. But we cannot rely solely on the NPT to deliver the goods. We must also take other actions.

At the 2000 NPT Review Conference the political climate plus good advocacy and diplomacy, produced a very good final document with 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament. In 2005 it was obvious to many of us that agreement would not be reached due to a widening split between some of the NWS who were retracting from 2000 agreements and extending their nuclear doctrine, and some non-NWS that were keen on developing proliferation sensitive nuclear technology. Thus, in 2005

many of us looked at what could be done outside the NPT that would not require agreement by all states parties. This included:

- cross-party resolutions in the US Congress on non-proliferation and disarmament and in other parliaments like Belgium on such issues as removal of tactical nuclear weapons,
- strengthening the existing NWFZs through the first ever conference of states parties to NWFZs which was held in Mexico,
- establishment of new nuclear weapons-free zones in particular one in Central Asia,
- building the public vision of a nuclear weapons-free world through engagement of over 1000 mayors in the nuclear abolition campaign,
- injecting the nuclear weapons issue back into the media through op ed pieces and presentations in the United Nations, US Congress and other parliaments by high level people including Jimmy Carter, Ted Turner, Robert MacNamara, Ted Sorenson, Mikhael Gorbachev and Jane Goodall and by the largest public anti-nuclear demonstration in New York since 1982, and
- encouraging diplomats to explore the requirements for a nuclear weapons-free world through an open-ended NPT working paper – later to be followed up by the establishment of the Article VI Forum – an ongoing diplomatic forum for exploring these ideas.

For the forthcoming NPT prep com and leading up to the NPT Review in 2010, I believe that parliamentarians need to continue this two-track approach – on the one hand getting involved in the NPT process, but also taking initiatives at national, regional and international levels to advance nuclear disarmament.

This could include parliamentary resolutions, like the one introduced into the US Congress by Democratic Presidential candidate Dennis Kucinich calling for the US to take a leadership in negotiations for a nuclear weapons convention.

It could include further parliamentary actions calling for the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and the establishment of a European NWFZ.

It could include endorsing the mayors and parliamentarians joint statement encouraging the United Nations General Assembly or the UN Conference on Disarmament to commence nuclear disarmament negotiations.

It could include the promotion of a NWFZ in the Middle East that would restrict proliferation sensitive technology such as uranium enrichment as well as provide a process for Israel to abandon the nuclear option with security guarantees.

The Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament, a non-partisan network of nearly 500 members in 68 countries, can help parliamentarians learn about issues and developments, share ideas and initiatives, become engaged in international disarmament forums, and develop collaborative actions. We are there to serve you – the legislators of the world, and we invite you to make use of what we offer in order to ensure that our visions of a safe nuclear weapons-free world do not remain just dreams but become the reality for our children.

## ANGELIKA BEER MEP

*Angelika Beer is the Chair of the Green/EFA Group in the European Parliament.*

This conference is more than important at the present time. This is the right moment to hold a conference on nuclear disarmament. This is not only because EU members recently decided to invest dozens of billions of euros in the modernisation of their nuclear weapons, or because NPT Preparatory Committee is approaching. It is also because at this moment the Nuclear Suppliers Group is meeting in Cape Town to discuss and perhaps to vote on the US-India deal on nuclear co-operation.



A positive and consensual vote on the US-India deal will have far-reaching consequences especially for the fight against nuclear weapons and their proliferation. It would have a serious effect on the NPT if we examine this in a historical perspective. With respect to the issues to be addressed by our panel I would like to introduce the following thoughts.

As Anna Gomes stated this morning, the EU's role in this area is non-existent in spite of its so called Common Foreign and Security Policy. There is no Common Foreign and Security Policy for nuclear *disarmament*. There is only a *non-proliferation* policy for weapons of mass destruction.

The reason I am telling this is four-fold. First, the relevant EU bodies have not reacted to the decisions of the UK and France to invest huge sums of money in the modernisation of their nuclear weapons. The NPT says that its member-states must disarm their arsenals. These decisions are therefore simply illegal. From a political point of view it is even worse because it gives the wrong signal to all those states which are thinking of developing their own nuclear weapons. Such modernisation programmes tell them that those weapon systems will be needed in the future and that if you haven't got one you will always be a second-class member of the international community.

The second point is that the EU has said nothing about US policies. It has no position on the fact that over 480 US tactical weapons are still on European soil and can, in a situation of war, be used by Germany, the Netherlands or Italy according to NATO's policy on nuclear-sharing. This constitutes a serious breach of the NPT because the countries which signed the treaty have not declared that they would, in a war situation, become Nuclear-Weapon States. In addition, the EU has not commented on the US plans to develop a new generation of so-called mini-nukes that could well be used in future pre-emptive strikes against enemy facilities. This even undermines the logic of nuclear deterrence which ultimately guaranteed a certain degree of predictable instability.

Thirdly, in March this year the European Parliament urged the Council of Ministers to adopt a common position on the NPT Preparatory Committee with the aim of reviewing the Treaty. I have also sent a written question on this to both the Council and the Commission. So far, there has been no result.

My final point concerns the US-India deal. This totally contradicts the NPT because India has developed and tested nuclear weapons which triggered an international embargo. It is a country which has refused to sign the NPT and which will open only some civilian facilities to IAEA inspection. The EU has no common position on this.

There are plans to reach an agreement with India with provisions similar to those concluded with other countries. This would not be worth the paper it is written on and would never be implemented.

To sum up: there is no common Foreign and Security Policy in the field of nuclear disarmament. As far as I and the Greens in this Parliament are concerned, the New Foreign and Security Policy should not only be about military capacities. It should also be about reducing threats by disarming WMD potential even when these belong to EU states. This is essential in order to ensure the survival of 450 million EU citizens.

Let me finally say something more positive about what the EU position should be. Firstly, the ultimate long-term objective must be world-wide phasing out of nuclear energy because of its severe risk to the survival of mankind and its extremely high cost because of accidents, as well as because of its potential for the development of nuclear weapons. Nuclear energy has always been a dual-use technology. It can be used both in a civil and a military way. That is why we aim for a future in which the world depends one hundred percent on renewable energy.

Secondly, we acknowledge that we cannot prevent states from developing civil nuclear programmes and we feel that in the coming years another 20-30 countries will try to develop a civil nuclear capacity which might also be used to develop nuclear weapons.

Thirdly, we think that for the short and medium term we need a multilateral instrument, for example, centralised enrichment under control of IAEA, to prevent states from developing national enrichment capabilities. This would considerably reduce the risk of proliferation.

Fourthly, we remain committed to the NPT and the IAEA because there is no realistic alternative international legal instrument with the function of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. However, we make a strong demand for the reform of both the NPT and the IAEA because of their highly contradictory tasks. This reform must have three aspects. Firstly, the promotion of nuclear energy as one of the three purposes of the NPT and the IAEA must be abandoned. They should be concerned only with non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Secondly, the nuclear disarmament obligations of Article VI of the NPT should be fully implemented. Thirdly, the IAEA budget should be increased so that it can carry out more effective inspections and other verification and control measures regarding non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

If member-states had the political will, such measures would be a peaceful way to put an end to the nuclear threats which we are well aware of. They would start disarmament on the one hand and prevent proliferation on the other.

## ANDRÉ BRIE MEP

*André Brie is a member of the European United Left group  
in the European Parliament*

I would like to focus on lessons learnt from the past disarmament treaties. Regarding the EU's position we have on the one hand a very general interest in supporting several multilateral arms control agreements. The previously mentioned European Parliamentary Resolution on the NPT reflects this general, positive position.



On the other hand, as was mentioned by Angelika Beer, the EU has not been able to develop a common policy in this area. Some of the member-states even contribute substantially to the further development of nuclear weapons and the militarisation of international relations. The EU is not ready to present an alternative to the present strategic and political approach of the US, and is therefore unable to effectively promote multilateralism, non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. It is much too passive in disarmament affairs.

In the past, attempts at disarmament reflected the bilateral conditions of the Cold War with domination by the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the US. This involved obvious dangers for them. They therefore needed to stabilise their relations and reduce some of the mutual threats. In several countries the public was strongly aware of the dangers and this resulted in significant movements demanding nuclear disarmament. The result was a system of arms control and important disarmament treaties, especially the NPT, the Outer Space Treaty, the ABM Treaty, and the Conventions on nuclear testing, biological weapons, and chemical weapons. Most of these treaties were characterised by bilateralism, and especially the Chemical Weapons Convention which became reality only after the end of the Cold War. These treaties should serve as a very important example for future disarmament initiatives. Not only did they prohibit or control important weapons of mass destruction; they also established very effective verification regimes.

At the moment I see an erosion of the existing limited system of arms control and disarmament, especially by the US. It has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and withheld Negative Security Assurances for non-nuclear weapons states which are members of the NPT. The US is not ready to establish a verification regime for the Biological Weapons Convention. There are threats from the US and Russia to reduce the effectiveness of the Chemical Weapons Convention and its verification régime. Regarding the EU, we do have a very positive position regarding the further development of the Biological Weapons Convention but due to pressure from the US it has not been willing to maintain the effort necessary to make this treaty an effective instrument for preventing the proliferation or development of one very dangerous weapon of mass destruction.

Up to now there has been a strong commitment by the EU and its member-states to the Chemical Weapons Convention, but there has not been an active policy to defend that treaty. This applies especially to the verification régime which has been rejected by the US which also refuses to finance it adequately. There is no discussion in the

national parliaments of the EU, or even in the European Parliament of the attempts of the US and Russia to alter the scope of the CWC by excluding the so-called “lesser” chemical weapons. Until now they have been prohibited for military purposes but allowed for use by the police. However, there are strong attempts by the US and Russia to exclude these from the legal framework of the CWC.

The EU does have an energetic negotiating position regarding Iran’s nuclear activities, but there are practically no efforts to contribute to real nuclear disarmament and the fulfillment of the NPT Article VI disarmament obligation. The EU has double standards not only regarding the nuclear programmes of the UK and France, but also in relation to Israel, India, and Pakistan. This destroys the credibility and effectiveness of EU policy in this area. Like the US, the UK withholds Negative Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear Weapon States. Many European member-states, which are also members of NATO, have accepted the official nuclear strategy adopted by the Alliance in October 1999.

My conclusion is that the context for nuclear and other disarmament has changed. The danger has not diminished. As was mentioned by the former Foreign Minister of Sweden this morning, it has become worse in many ways because of the threat of more Nuclear-Weapon States or even of non-state nuclear actors.

Of course we are no longer living in a bilateral world dominated the by two superpowers which present an equilibrium of forces, including nuclear forces. The overwhelming unilateral superiority of the US in the military sphere leads, on the contrary, to a tendency by US and its allies to rely on this superiority and to maintain it. They do not see the dangers, including those for the US and the EU, of the continuing existence and development of nuclear weapons and other armaments. For the EU this approach has outweighed the fact that it is a comprehensive political approach, and mutual disarmament under the rule of law, which can provide international security and stability for states and their peoples. . Military superiority cannot meet these needs.

Public awareness of the need for disarmament and a broad political movement in favour of disarmament has diminished. However, there is one positive example in recent years that could serve as a very important lesson, namely the Montreal agreement on the prohibition of landmines. It was the first international agreement that was initiated not by governments, but by a broad public movement. Public opinion has always been a decisive prerequisite for nuclear disarmament. Parliamentarians must play a role in a new civic movement in favour of disarmament and of a revival of the nuclear non-proliferation régime. Otherwise we shall face the very negative and dangerous developments which have been described today.

## TOM SAUER

*Tom Sauer is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics  
at the University of Antwerp*

I would like to point out that it is possible to make a career, even an academic career, and at the same time be critical, indeed very critical about nuclear weapons. Even more, the major thing that I have been doing for the last ten years is writing books, academic articles, working papers, and opinion articles in which I criticised the Nuclear-Weapon States. And it pays - at least for me. But unfortunately, it is bad for the world. Because it means that not much has changed despite all our protest. I am not saying that we should halt our protest. On the contrary. We should think harder to find out how we can obtain concrete results with respect to the implementation of effective steps towards nuclear elimination.



One of the most striking things in this business, in contrast with other fields like environmental issues, human rights issues, or development issues, is the enormous gap between the beliefs of grass root organisations and those of the policy establishment, even within Non-Nuclear Weapon States. I know for instance the Belgian official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who is in charge of arms control, proliferation, and disarmament quite well. He is nice guy, and he is doing his job very well. But he simply does not believe in nuclear elimination. He thinks, just like our former Prime Minister Mark Eyskens, that nuclear elimination is – to use his words – “a nice dream”.

That is a major problem, probably the biggest problem of all. Because in our political systems, it is the government and not the grass root movements that makes policy. And in our rather technical field, the policy is basically set by rather low-level officials, not the minister himself or herself because in practice he or she only has 24 hours a day (just like us) and does not regard nuclear elimination or even nuclear non-proliferation as a priority.

The problem is that if government officials do not believe that nuclear elimination is a practical goal (as in Belgium), then they are not going to invest the necessary efforts in reaching it. That is why Belgium – a Non-Nuclear Weapon State - will probably agree with the American-Indian nuclear agreement inside the Nuclear Suppliers Group despite the fact that it goes completely against both the letter and the spirit of the NPT and the NSG rules. That is why Belgium does not protest when one of our neighbours decides to modernize its nuclear weapons systems, so that it can continue its illegal policy – I refer to Article VI of the NPT - until at least 2050. That is why Belgium still participates in the NATO Nuclear Policy Group, still agrees with NATO's nuclear weapons policy, and still has American nuclear weapons on its territory. That, at least, is what our government would like us to believe.

The underlying assumption of most government officials in the NWS and its allies is that a nuclear weapons-free world is something for idealists, utopianists. They are wrong. Each time they come up with this argument we should turn that logic upside down and say that they are wrong. We should tell them and our citizens that it is

idealistic, utopian, to believe that it is possible to keep running this world with 8, 9, 10, 12, 15 nuclear weapon states over the next 15, 20, 30 years without the re-introduction of nuclear weapons into the battlefield. And for nuclear weapons the battlefields are cities. The only realistic endgame is a world without nuclear weapons.

Advocates of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence in contrast simply do not have an endgame. They believe that proliferation can be managed. That is wishful thinking, not realistic thinking. If we look to the history of nuclear proliferation, on average every six years a new nuclear state has emerged. Of more concern is the nature of the latest proliferators: North Korea, willing to sell their stuff to any one with money; and Pakistan where Dr Khan had a kind of nuclear Wall Mart. For those interested in obtaining nuclear weapons, the hurdles become lower each year. The most worrying fact is that this also applies to non-state actors. Catastrophic terrorists are not so much interested in the technology of implosion, as in the effects of explosion. Nuclear terrorism would relegate 9/11 to a footnote in history. Therefore, a nuclear weapons-free world should not be regarded as a long-term dream, but as a real world challenge that has to be implemented within a specific time span with resources that are of course always limited.

I would like to make a couple of points in passing:

1. We are talking about how to get rid of the weapons, not the knowledge of how to make them. This knowledge will never disappear. The latter is not only a fact; it is also part of the solution. Part of the solution consists in the deterrent effect of starting to building nuclear weapons again. Nuclear deterrence will therefore always be with us, but it will not be the existential deterrence that we are used to, but post-existential deterrence, or virtual nuclear deterrence. Weapons won't deter weapons anymore. But factories (or labs) will deter factories (or labs). Drawing tables will deter drawing tables. And knowledge will deter knowledge. But in the meantime, we can get rid of the weapons.

2. I would only agree to take the last step, going from 1 towards zero, on the condition that all nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states participate. The most difficult country to convince may be Israel. For the latter, the international community, or some states, may have to offer some security guarantees. But that is something completely different to saying (as our Belgian official for instance does) that we can only get rid of nuclear weapons if there are no conflicts in the world anymore. This amounts to saying that we cannot get rid of nuclear weapons at all.

3. Another condition is the creation of a far-reaching verification regime. That would not be a problem as no country would have anything to hide. All states would be equal in this regard, in contrast to the discriminatory regime of today. The Chemical Weapons Convention shows that such a regime can be set up. As it is far more difficult to produce nuclear than chemical weapons, this will not be a problem either.

4. I hear the more sceptical ones among you already arguing: "what if a state cheats in a nuclear weapons-free World? That state – take North Korea - can blackmail the rest of the world". The response is the following: it will be extremely unlikely that in a nuclear weapons-free world, a state will go nuclear. That is partly a norm-issue; it will be very hard to go against a worldwide accepted norm. Each day that a norm exists and is abided by, that norm is strengthened, and it will become more difficult to go against it. But at the same time it is also more than a norm-issue. For the so-called realists amongst you: what would a cheater do with one or two or three nuclear



weapons in a Nuclear Weapons-Free World? Nothing. The rest of the world would be united in opposing it. The rest of the world would require that the cheater gives in; if he did not, he would simply be bombed into the pre-nuclear era. And in case this did not do the trick, the rest of the world could go nuclear too. These scenarios do not look very attractive to potential cheaters.

Let me now say a few brief words about Europe. Apart from the usual suspects, countries like Ireland and Sweden, most European states seem not to worry about nuclear weapons very much. In contrast to the US, the absence of a societal debate, especially at the elite level, is striking. A couple of months ago, Henry Kissinger, Bill Perry, Sam Nunn and George Schultz, who are not obvious icons of the peace movement, wrote an article in *The Wall Street Journal*, making it clear why nuclear elimination is in the national interest of the US. Maybe I missed it, but I have not seen European politicians at this level doing the same. I am happy that our former PM Jean-Luc Dehaene has spoken out in favour of elimination recently and is even actively supporting this conference today, but I propose he does something similar to Kissinger, together with his former colleagues in the Netherlands (and I know that Ruud Lubbers is interested in it), Germany and perhaps other countries. They could for instance launch the idea of a nuclear weapons-free Europe.

The biggest responsibility, however, lays with our active politicians, especially those in power. Why do the Belgian, Dutch, German, and Italian Socialists or the Christian-Democrats (with the emphasis either on Christian or Democrat) for instance not cooperate in getting rid of the American nuclear weapons on our soil? That should not be that difficult. It is my impression that it is not the US that will object to the withdrawal. Secondly, they should put pressure on their French and British colleagues both in parliament and in government to get rid of their nuclear weapons. I agree that there are easier jobs. But if Europe really has the ambition of being an example to the rest of the world, and an alternative to the more assertive Americans (be they Republicans or Democrats), let us - Europeans - take the lead in nuclear disarmament.

Let me finish on a more sobering note. The EU has recently tried to take the lead not in nuclear disarmament, but in the nuclear non-proliferation business, and particularly vis-à-vis Iran. It seems that the EU approach is failing. After more than three and a half years, the EU has not been able to convince Iran to give up its nuclear programme. I have done some research on this topic and the article will be available somewhere. The answer of the Brussels Eurocrats is that I am too critical. Firstly, they argue, the US did not succeed either. Secondly, "in contrast to the Iraq crisis, the EU was and still is united vis-à-vis Iran. That is a big step forward", they argue. Both arguments are correct but they are not to the point. Being united but not being effective does not mean very much. In short, it was and still is, a nice try by the EU, but it is probably going to fail. The EU overestimated its own powers of persuasion in 2003, and at the same time it has underestimated Iran's motivation. The latter is hard to understand. Iran is probably seeking nuclear weapons for exactly the same reasons as the UK and France did in the past: security and prestige. As long as we publicly say that nuclear weapons are vital for our security, others will copy us, and it will be impossible to prevent other states like Iran from doing exactly the same. You can always try and sometimes you will succeed (as in the case of Libya), but the odds are that you will fail. That is exactly what is happening today in the case of Iran. One additional NWS keeps the nuclear dominoes falling. It is high noon, time for the Nuclear-Weapon States to do some introspection. Let us try to help them. Thank you very much.

## DR STEPHEN PULLINGER

### PRESERVING THE COHERENCE OF THE NPT: NON-PROLIFERATION, DISARMAMENT AND DOUBLE STANDARDS

*Dr Stephen Pullinger is the Executive Director of the International Security  
Information Service (ISIS), Europe*

The coherence of the NPT centres around the link between non-proliferation and disarmament. These two elements are not divorced from each other – they are two sides of the same coin.

During the Cold War we tended to lose sight of that. The overriding priority was to prevent a nuclear war – it was about managing the superpower confrontation. Disarmament seemed out of the question – ceasing the arms race was the best we could hope for. And preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons became a secondary concern.



Today the situation is very different. With the Cold War over, the major nuclear powers are no longer obsessed with deterring each other. Substantial reductions in arsenals have been possible. On the downside, however, the spread of nuclear weapons to volatile regions of the world has become a more pressing and immediate concern.

My contention is that today's changed circumstances require us to re-order our nuclear priorities and this necessitates a corresponding change in policies. I believe that our chances of winning the battle against the spread of nuclear weapons will be hugely improved if we embrace nuclear disarmament as an integral part of that battle – and it is a battle, because if we fail the consequences for all of us will be catastrophic. Simply trying to halt proliferation without seriously embarking on disarmament will not work.

That is not just my conclusion that is the opinion of George P. Shultz – Secretary of State under Ronald Reagan, William J. Perry – Clinton's Defence Secretary, Henry A. Kissinger – Secretary of State under Nixon, and Sam Nunn – former Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In January in the Wall Street Journal they wrote

*"We endorse setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal..."*

The leaders of countries in possession of nuclear weapons need to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a "joint enterprise". They went on to make the point that this would "lend additional weight to efforts already under way to avoid the emergence of a nuclear-armed North Korea and Iran".

[http://www.fcni.org/issues/item.php?item\\_id=2252&issue\\_id=54](http://www.fcni.org/issues/item.php?item_id=2252&issue_id=54)

So why are these political heavyweights so worried about current trends that they are prepared seriously to propose that we should be working energetically to rid the world of all nuclear weapons? The answer, according to the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan is that: "*Without concerted action, we may face a cascade of nuclear proliferation,*" (5 August 2006).

If that does happen - if we fail to prevent it happening - then it will be hugely more difficult to deal with the problem. A “cascade” of proliferation might produce fifteen, twenty or more national nuclear weapon programmes. That would mean:

1. massive new investment being poured into developing nuclear weapons;
2. tons of new weapons-grade fissile material being produced;
3. and hundreds more people acquiring the knowledge of how to make nuclear weapons.

We have to be really concerned about how well these proliferant states would be able to establish safe, secure, well managed programmes under centralized control. There would be real danger - as we saw when the Soviet Union fell apart - that materials and know how would leak onto the black market and end up in terrorist hands or those of other dangerous regimes. These new proliferant states would presumably try to develop robust command and control procedures. But the expectation must be that a proportion of them will not succeed. The risk of accidental war being triggered, especially at times of crisis, would be a real worry. Some new proliferants may be democracies; others will be authoritarian regimes. Their governments may well be relatively stable, others far less so.

In addition to the new proliferant *states*, there would also be the extremist and fundamentalist terrorist groups with growing opportunities to acquire the wherewithal to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. Almost inevitably, there would be many more potential A. Q. Khans around – willing to sell nuclear ‘know how’ and blueprints to the highest bidder.

So my conclusion from this is that proliferation is a dangerously destabilising force in international relations. You might think this is fairly obvious but not everyone regards the spread of nuclear weapons as quite such a destabilising force. There are some who still equate nuclear weapons with deterrence and see deterrence as an inherently stabilising concept that prevents wars.

I disagree with that analysis. I think that to believe that a world of twenty nuclear powers might settle at a new equilibrium of multiple deterrent relationships is dangerously complacent. Instead, the world would be faced with some unpredictable governments deploying nuclear weapons in volatile regions of the planet, with inadequate command and control mechanisms, reliant on “use them or lose them” doctrines, that would vastly increase the risks of nuclear war – whether started deliberately or accidentally.

**This vision of 20 or more nuclear weapon states should frighten every policy maker in every capital around the world. Clearly it now frightens hard-headed realists like Henry Kissinger as much it frightens the more traditional supporters of nuclear disarmament. Yet this is the future towards which the world is now heading unless we reverse the trends.**

Hence, contemporary and foreseeable nuclear threats now have to be *re-ordered*:

1. A regional nuclear war between two nuclear-armed states through misunderstanding or deliberate act (for instance – India/Pakistan, North Korea/South Korea, Iran/Israel) in volatile regions of the world with unstable deterrence and ‘hair trigger’ alert status adding to the likelihood of use.

2. The insecurity of nuclear weapons, material and expertise, especially within states that collapse or experience internal conflict, and a nexus with terrorists gaining access to a nuclear weapon or sufficient weapons-grade fissile material to make a nuclear weapon, which they then threaten to use and/or actually use.
3. **Now only in the third place** – No Nuclear-armed state directly threatens the EU's vital national interests.
4. Accidental nuclear war between the established nuclear powers.

So today, nuclear deterrence provided by European nuclear powers is only relevant to meeting one of these four threats. It is *non-proliferation policy* that has the primary role to play in meeting the top nuclear threats. And yet most analysts now agree that the entire non-proliferation regime – centered around the NPT - is creaking under the strain, and unless we address its underlying problems it may disintegrate with dire consequences for all of us.

So what is placing the NPT under strain?

FIRST – because the treaty is said to have failed to prevent clandestine nuclear weapons activities in Iraq, North Korea and Iran

SECOND – because the NPT permits states to develop sophisticated civil nuclear technology that can subsequently be upgraded to manufacture nuclear weapons - and that gap can be as short as 6 months.

THIRD - Because three of the nuclear weapon states outside of the NPT have no incentive to join it: Israel because it believes its national survival to be at stake - India because it is now receiving the benefits of membership without the costs (thanks to the deal that the US has recently agreed) – and Pakistan because it mirrors India's position.

The FOURTH problem is because Iran and North Korea - for different reasons - see the value in possessing nuclear arms - neither of them wants to suffer the same fate as non-nuclear-armed Iraq.

FIFTH - because there are numbers of other states that are watching developments in North Korea and Iran very closely - some of which are beginning to wonder whether they could continue to do without nuclear weapons if these countries become fully-fledged nuclear weapon powers.

And lastly - because none of the five 'acknowledged' Nuclear-Weapon States really believes that the global elimination of nuclear weapons is possible and cannot contemplate renouncing them.

This last point brings me to the substance of the question posed in the title of this panel: How to preserve the coherence of the NPT?

Unfortunately there is no sign yet that the leaders of the major nuclear powers are prepared to face up to the - for them - unpalatable truth that ultimately they will only be able to achieve their non-proliferation objectives if they are also prepared to work much more diligently towards disarmament. At the moment they still think they can 'have their cake and eat it' - they can have their nuclear weapons forever, while successfully persuading everyone else to do without. This 'double standard' argument is not merely a superficial debating point; it goes to the heart of the link between nuclear weapon possession and non-proliferation. The nuclear powers say

that this discrimination between possessors and non-possessors is exactly the distinction that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) sustains.

This is true... but only up to a point - and for how much longer?

The essential bargain contained in the NPT, between those states parties who possess nuclear weapons and those who agree to forego them, was never intended as a permanent basis upon which to order the world.

### **So what needs to be done now?**

I think we should embrace what Kissinger and the others refer to as a renewed 'Joint enterprise' in order to reach what we might call a new 'International Nuclear Settlement' – a package of self-reinforcing measures that would rejuvenate a regime that has become stuck - between those who don't want others to get the Bomb but also don't want to disarm - those who are intent on cheating the system - and those who are losing confidence in the non-proliferation regime as a consequence.

To reach a successful nuclear 'settlement' we need to have parallel, twin-track approach – with a DISARMAMENT track and a NON-PROLIFERATION track.

### **Firstly then - what might the Disarmament track look like?**

To start this off and running we need **the existing nuclear powers to get around the negotiating table, thrash out their mutual commitment to such a course and set out a detailed 'road map' of how to go forward.** They will only do this if they decide that it is in their best interests – in their long-term security interest to work towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons. This requires political leadership from the very top – it won't just happen with foreign ministers going through the motions – it needs president and prime ministers to take this forward.

Although actually setting the goal of trying to achieve a world without nuclear weapons is important it does not *necessarily* follow that the ultimate achievement of such an objective can or will be reached. The important point is the degree to which the intention is serious and sincere, and the consequent level of commitment devoted to reaching the ultimate goal.

The further necessary steps to *complete* denuclearization might prove impracticable to take for any number of reasons. Nevertheless, we can travel a lot further down the road of nuclear confidence building, arms control and partial disarmament before such an ultimate decision stage is reached.

The starting point should be to negate nuclear weapons' coercive influence in international relations between nation states: to devalue them as instruments of political power. Essentially we want to get to the situation whereby the **ONLY** role of nuclear weapons is to deter the use of other nuclear weapons – so that essentially they cancel each other out, while at the same time we reduce their numbers and reconfigure their deployments. Existing political assurances and other legal constraints on the circumstances in which nuclear weapons might be used should be codified into a new, legally binding instrument.

There is a series of practical measures to be taken – all of which will make us more secure not less.

- Begin a new multilateral process of denuclearization, involving carefully staged reductions in nuclear weapons and posture with a view to achieving the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons – including the withdrawal of all tactical

nuclear weapons from Europe, the US and Russia; The negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty; The CTBT to enter into force

- Assist those states embarked upon nuclear disarmament to safely dispose of nuclear weapons, guard and neutralise weapons-grade materials, and ensure that nuclear weapons expertise is securely re-assigned to other employment.
- Press for all nuclear weapons to be taken off hair trigger alert, and provide assistance to states with their command and control procedures, and confidence-building measures, within the context of moving towards denuclearization.

It will be important that India, Israel and Pakistan have to be included in this Disarmament Track.

### **And what of the parallel Non-Proliferation Track?**

- Through diplomacy and containment - we need to continue to seek to resolve the proliferation concerns surrounding North Korea and Iran. I would suggest that this would be easier to achieve within the context of a new global momentum behind denuclearization for everyone.
- We need to provide greater reassurances to countries such as South Korea, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey – the next ‘tier’ of potential proliferants - that they will not be subjected to nuclear threats - and that extended security guarantees remain steadfast.
- In the new context we must be prepared to crack down hard on *serious* non-compliance with the NPT i.e. when the credibility of the regime is at stake.
- Overcoming the reality that the technology required for producing *civil* nuclear fuel can also be used to develop nuclear *weapons* is not easy. One way forward is to ensure that the model Additional Protocol – which allows for stronger verification of compliance – is universally adopted. Another proposal is to create incentives for states voluntarily to forego the development of domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium separation, while guaranteeing the supply of the fuel necessary to develop peaceful uses. This might be done through the IAEA acting as a guarantor for the supply of fissile material to civilian nuclear users at market rates.
- More widely - Foreign Policies must be consistent with our non-proliferation objectives. Nuclear weapons should have no role to play as coercive tools of foreign policy – and certainly not in the context of preventive war doctrine, which should be renounced as a fundamentally unstable basis upon which to sustain international relations.

### **Conclusion**

- We must reinvigorate the Disarmament Track as the best means of ensuring that the Non-Proliferation Track succeeds.
- We need to forge a new approach built on the principles of international law and its effective enforcement – to reward abstinence from nuclear weapons and punish treaty violators - and to apply those principles consistently to *all* states.
- Upon this basis we may be able to achieve a successful NPT Review Conference in 2010, and lead us eventually to a world free of nuclear weapons – a goal to which every Party to that Treaty is committed.

## ANNEMIE NEYTS-UYTTEBROEACK MEP

*Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck is a member of the bureau of the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe*

First I would like to say something about my personal background so that there is no misunderstanding. I belong to the Flemish Liberal Party which is certainly not considered to be the most progressive and modern of the political parties in Belgium. We have now renamed ourselves as *Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten* or VLD.



I am not posing here as a person who has been a pacifist for all of her life. I was born in June 1944 and grew up with all the stories about war and occupation, about Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and concluded that war was the ultimate evil. I came to understand at an early and tender age that in the last resort it's the politicians who decide between war and peace. That is probably what most moved me to enter politics - to try to make sure that decisions would be on the side of peace and not of war.

When I was growing up in the 50s, 60s and 70s the world was rather simple. You had two big camps and you were either in one camp or the other, depending on your personal inclination, geography, and history. After the demise of Communism in all the Eastern Central European states, one might have thought there would very quickly be a peace dividend and a substantial part of this would be in terms of the continued efforts in favour of arms control and disarmament.

This did not happen. I can tell you one anecdote which I believe is very revealing. During Easter 1986 we had a European Democratic Conference in Catania in Sicily. We also had a European Liberal Leaders meeting. At the time I was a junior member of the Belgian Government. That was just a few days after the meeting between Mr Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan which had taken place in Iceland. I'll never forget that the then Foreign Minister of Germany, Hans Dietrich Genscher, said during this private meeting that they were negotiating away almost all the nuclear weapons in Europe. We were hardly prepared, we had not been informed of what would be on the table. I had no reason to question Hans Dietrich Genscher, but those were the days when negotiations were aimed at the reduction of nuclear weapons and not on their renewal.

That was quite a different period. We might ask why, in spite of the initial reduction of tension between the two blocs, and in spite of the fact that for several years there has been only one remaining superpower, this effort has not been maintained. Generally the answers are that we had 11 September 2001, the effects on New York, the War on Terror, and the clash, or possible clash, of civilisations. Recently there has been a possible new arms race between US and Russia.

I believe that these are superficial reasons because if we take a close look at the ones I mentioned, it seems to me that they do not explain North Korea, Iran or India/Pakistan and I'm not sure they even explain Israel. The Clinton Administration, as I experienced it, was not entirely devoted to multilateralism and disarmament. They looked after their own interests as they perceived them, just as in other American administrations have done; but at least they seemed to be willing to give multilateralism a chance. However, the George W Bush administration, right from

the start, even before 9/11, decided that they were not going to continue this policy. . This is a decisive difference between the two American administrations.

I've always had the intuition that nations, states, and institutions somehow behave and react as individual human beings do. I have a friend, a psychiatrist, who is now the president of *Liberal International*. He has been very active in helping to broker peace agreements in Northern Ireland and he holds the same view.

If there is some truth in this approach, then we might wonder whether the isolation N. Korea, Iran and, differently but also, Israel, have found themselves in, explains why they engage in military development in general and nuclear development in particular. I don't think that the isolation of a state, whether self-imposed or imposed from the outside, in the form of an embargo for example, is conducive to a strong sense of security in the nation and the government concerned

I also wonder how far US policies have influenced this sense of isolation in various countries. It's not that we want to lambaste them for every evil or wrong in the world, but we might ask whether things would have evolved in the same way if the US had been more willing to support various forms of regional co-operation. They have generally been active in discouraging these except when they themselves could play a role. Perhaps such forms of regional co-operation might have alleviated the sense of isolation of some states.

Secondly, if nations and states and institutions act as if they were individual human beings, then of course, even-handedness and equal standards become all the more important. How convincing is the credibility of states that want to keep their own nuclear arsenals, when they then approach Iran and say that you aren't qualified to have one? The answer, of course, is self-evident. I am not entirely sure that one can be content with the classical answer that the nuclear arsenal in a democratic country poses no threat at all, while the tiniest nuclear military device in a less democratic nation would be a major threat to world peace.


I believe that we need to promote non-proliferation in the first stage, secondly the reduction of the number of nuclear weapons, and then, possibly, their complete elimination. We need to take into account the hardening of the prevailing culture. More attention was paid to "soft power" up to ten years ago than today. We now see a renewed celebration of all things military. This makes our arguments even more difficult to put over because it goes against the grain of the times - *l'esprit du temps* as we say in French. For the time being we would be well advised to take this hardening of positions into account and take note of the possible shifting of priorities regarding public and political action. I only need to mention the very different reactions to the bilateral initiatives to set up elements of a missile defence shield. We had a debate on that in the European Parliament. The positive thing is that we had a debate at all and that we were promised further debate, while only a few years ago they would have said it was none of our business, because it was strictly bilateral. The downside was that there wasn't much distinction between the attitudes of MEPs coming from the various member-states. There was general agreement that it was a matter of sovereignty, a bilateral issue. But at least we had the debate and we will continue to have it.



## PAUL INGRAM

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British American Security Information Council (BASIC)*

I shall be talking about three issues. First I shall look at the Non-Proliferation regime as it is and conclude that it is an unstable system. Secondly I will examine the debate about Trident Replacement in the UK with some optimistic remarks about where we are going with this in Britain. Then I talk about some of the steps that are needed to strengthen the NPT as we move towards 2010.



It is important to remember that treaties can be successful. The NPT has been an extraordinary success, difficult as this is to believe as we sit here today. It has largely prevented proliferation. The prediction when it was first signed was that by now we would have 30 or 40 states with nuclear weapons. However, it has acquired a near- universal scope. It has a verification system, the IAEA that has, over time, gained strength both formally because of the adoption by states of the Additional Protocol, and informally, through the learning process that inspectors have experienced over the decades. The IAEA today, is in far far better shape and healthier than it was when it set up in the 1950s.

The NPT provides the framework for disarmament. If the NPT did not exist there would be no universal treaty that Nuclear-Weapon States could be held accountable to. But of course it has its weaknesses. Perhaps the principal one is the varying perspectives that different countries have towards it. Some of the Western Nuclear - Weapon States see the NPT as a means whereby they can play world policemen to ensure that other countries do not acquire nuclear weapons. Others, such as Russia and China, and certainly France and the UK, see the NPT as a backdrop to their own status as world powers alongside their permanent membership of the Security Council. Some states outside the NPT have seen it as no more than a piece of paper, a blanket to legitimise the privileged position of the Nuclear-Weapon States. They have therefore not wanted to take part in it. Countries like India expressed this view explicitly during the negotiation of the NPT and Iran increasingly adopts the same attitude. The Non-Aligned Movement perceives the Treaty as legitimating discrimination in the international system. Such states aim either to reform the NPT or to seek its destruction. Another group of perceptions is that the NPT might be a blanket for countries to acquire the technology for nuclear weapons capability quite legitimately through their exercise of Article IV. Finally, there are those who see the Treaty as an essential step towards a nuclear weapon-free world. That is the intention recorded in the Treaty itself.

We can exist in a world where there are different perceptions of treaties. But when those perceptions come into direct conflict with one other, as is happening with the NPT, the consequence is that the system becomes unstable and unsustainable.

At first sight the NPT appears to be remarkably stable today. There are 5 Nuclear-Weapon States and 187 Non-Nuclear Weapon States with only 4 countries outside the system. That is remarkably near-universal acceptance. No other arms control treaty has achieved anything like as many signatures although the current system is relatively recent. China and France only joined in the early 1990s, Cuba in 2002.

But this belies the fact that there have actually been quite a few shocks to the system recently. One positive shock was the end of the Cold War which opened up the possibility of Article VI being taken more seriously. During the Cold War nobody really believed that Article VI would ever be implemented. With the end of the Cold War, that certainly changed. The accession of France and China meant that the NPT was considerably strengthened.

The negative shocks include the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, and the development of a nuclear weapons capability by North Korea and its possible development in Iran. There was also the election of Bush and the neo-conservatives in 2000 with their suspicion of international treaties, the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and its adoption of the Nuclear Posture Review in 2001. More shocks will further destabilize an already unstable treaty.

There are various categories of possible future-shock. The first and most obvious is “breakout”. This has already happened with N Korea. It has exercised its right under Article X and withdrawn from the Treaty. There was some controversy about that, but they’ve done it. They exploded a nuclear weapon at the end of last year. Other countries might follow suit. Iran is not the only country that could do this.

There is also the possibility of re-armament. This received some media attention earlier this year when one of the most senior Russian military officials threatened Russian withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in direct response to the American’s proposal to site missile-defence interceptors in Poland and the Czech Republic. This sends some extremely worrying signals about the potential for a new Cold War resulting in re-armament.

On the other hand there could be breakthroughs in negotiations which none of us can foresee. Positive things happen without people predicting them. The end of the Cold War is the most obvious example. There are also exogenous pressures which could change the system. For example, there could be a much tighter financial situation in the Nuclear-Weapon States making it increasingly expensive to stay in the game. There may be the recognition of alternative threats, such as climate change and energy insecurity, leading governments to understand the need to collaborate more.

So there are reasons to be optimistic as well as pessimistic. But at root we face a global choice. On the one hand we have a global commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation, and on the other inevitable further proliferation leading to an increasingly unstable world. Sitting on the fence will no longer be an option. So disarmament is fundamental.

I shall now focus on the recent debate in Britain about the replacement of Trident. Trident is a submarine-based nuclear weapon system deploying American-made Trident missiles with British-made nuclear warheads. We are told by the Government that Britain needs to make a decision in the next year or two in order to gear up for replacing the submarines by the time they reach the end of their lives in about 2020.

The Government provided two key reasons to support replacement. The most obvious was fear of the future. We needed an “insurance policy”, just in case things became difficult - perhaps the emergence of a country like Iran that would threaten Britain’s basic interests. This argument was based on deterrence and it came up again and again. The other argument was that if we failed to retain the workforce in Barrow where the submarines are constructed, we would lose the capability of building submarines in future.

An issue equally important is the sense of national identity. Britain is historically an imperial power. It has been extremely influential in the past, and has continued to think of itself as “punching above its weight”. Nuclear weapons play a very important role in that identity. There is also a strong sense of political conservatism: what happened in the past was good and that we should therefore continue in the same way. This leads to political inflexibility and a reduced expectation of change both within the elite and with the public generally. Even people who are generally supportive of moving towards a non-nuclear weapon status do not expect that position to gain enough political support to fundamentally change policy.

There is also the incredibly powerful experience of a political party that had a nuclear disarmament policy in the 1980s. The myth is that this single issue lost them two general elections. So nuclear disarmament was perceived as far too radical. As a result, there is now a party in Government with that experience. Even individuals within the party who fundamentally believe in nuclear disarmament also think that if they were open about this they would lose their position in the Government. This reflects the global perception that political parties that are strong on defence do well in the ballot box. This factor might be more important than all the others.

As a result, we in BASIC concluded that there was no chance at all of winning a vote against Trident renewal in the House of Commons. We decided instead to focus on the timing. We had been told that the submarines had a life expectancy of 25 years. This could be extended for 5 years, but with difficulty. It would need 17 years to construct the replacement submarines. The clock started ticking in 1992 when the first submarine, HMS Vanguard, went through its initial tests. In March last year we reminded Defence Committee of the operational changes announced in 1998. These meant that there were fewer submarine patrols with a reduced readiness to fire. This has increased the life expectancy of the submarines. Abandoning the policy of continuous at-sea deterrence would have no effect on British security and this would dramatically lengthen the life expectancy of the existing submarines. Therefore we do not need to make the replacement decision now.

We also questioned the idea that replacement would take 17 years to carry out. We could purchase American submarines – after all, we bought the missiles from the US. Alternatively, we could just build an upgraded version of the existing Vanguard class which would take 7 rather than 17 years. We also questioned the start date, 1994, which was when the submarines were first commissioned. Instead of making the decision now we could simply start to do research and development and then perhaps make a final decision when we knew exactly what the contracts and costs were.

Why has BASIC been pushing this argument so hard? Firstly, we wanted to ensure that Britain was not compromised by making the replacement decision prior to the 2010 NPT Review Conference. In addition, from a military perspective, it actually pays to be flexible and keep one’s options open. There is a very strong danger that the missiles would be redundant by 2042 when the Americans stop using them. We might well have a launching system with no missiles. We also calculated that a delay of 10 years would save £5 billion. In addition, a delay would enable a proper public assessment of the need to replace Trident and a full debate on all the options.

The real reasons why there was a rush were three-fold. Firstly was Tony Blair’s desire to have a legacy, to hand on the idea that New Labour would retain a strong commitment to defence and thereby strengthen the idea that it is electable. Secondly there was the lobbying pressure from BAE systems. Thirdly, there was the link with

the American Trident system because the Americans themselves are looking towards upgrading their missiles. If the British were to stay with the old system, that might weaken that link.

So our strategy was to brief politicians, officials, and the media, to provide media interviews, and to give evidence to the Defence Committee. We had a debate at Royal United Services Institute the week before the debate in Parliament and we wrote various papers and briefings for MPs on different aspects of the delay. These had quite a populist perspective on something that appears rather technical at first sight. The final one highlighted the damage to the military itself and thereby to Britain's capacity to operate on a global scale in other aspects than nuclear weapons.

What did we achieve? Well, the media focus in this debate was shifted away from a pro and anti-nuclear exchange, towards questioning the Government's motives for urgency. I think this was quite an achievement. As a result we were part of the reason why the debate in the House of Commons revolved round a key amendment focused on delay. The Prime Minister himself, just prior to the debate, said that there was no reason why the British Parliament shouldn't re-visit the matter before the construction of the submarines in 2012,13, or 14. This gives us a crucial window of opportunity.

So, where do we go now? A question that hasn't been answered by the Government is: who is going to pay? There will be a Comprehensive Spending Review later this year which will look at different departments' spending limits. The Ministry of Defence faces an enormous deficit of £12 billion in its existing defence procurement budget over the next 10-15 years. That does not include Trident. So the Ministry of Defence is already short of cash. There is also the possibility of escalating costs. We have already seen enormous unforeseen costs in the construction of the Millennium Dome, and the cost of the Olympics has trebled in the last two years. This is an aspect which everybody is suspicious of. While we have been told that Trident will cost £15-20 billion to procure, nobody seriously believes it will stay at that. So the cost is quite a crucial argument. Over the next 5 or 6 years, as public expenditure within Britain becomes tighter and tighter, the pressures to re-visit this decision will become stronger and stronger. We will also see pressure from the military. If they have to face a choice between spending money on equipment they can actually use, and on what is essentially a political weapon, the latter will be increasingly unpopular.

If we can maximise the international damage to Britain's reputation for making such a decision, that will also help. But we also need to change the domestic dynamics. We have been focusing on the arguments around skills and industrial concerns and have recently published a report, "Oceans of Work", which demonstrates that there are more jobs to be had, and especially more skilled jobs, in new and emerging industries such as renewable technologies. We cannot tackle the parties keen to appear strong on defence, but what we can demonstrate is that this is a cost choice - being strong on defence or spending money on useless weapons.

We also need to tackle the sense of national identity and realise that within Europe Britain is actually middle-range power not a hyper-power. We need to deal with the expectation that little change is possible and encourage people to be more optimistic. We should contest the idea that we need an "insurance policy" and depend more on what is, at root, a self-help international system. Strengthening international organisations such as the EU and the UN will undermine fear of the future.

So returning to the NPT, what are the dynamics needed to stabilise it? We need a shared goal rather than diffuse perspectives. We need credible commitments from the Nuclear-Weapons States, and from the other countries, agreed without coercion. We need a regular review of progress. We need management and facilitation by an organisation with universal support and we need a public profile. All but the last of these have already been agreed by the international community at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. These include re-visiting the 13 steps, which included a test moratorium, an entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a Fissile Material Treaty to be agreed in the Conference on Disarmament, and bringing more stocks under the IAEA safeguards. Crucially, we need progress on disarmament, including unilateral steps by the Nuclear-Weapon States, increased transparency and the like, with the ultimate agreed objective of complete nuclear disarmament.

Moving to NATO and the European role, there has been a lot of talk today, and quite rightly, about calling to account British and French nuclear weapons. It is very important for the rest of Europe to keep that pressure up. In addition, NATO's strategic concept rests on nuclear weapons, even today in 2007. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons are still stationed in a number of NATO states, in spite of the fact that they are intended to be Non-Nuclear Weapon States. This locks NATO members into a commitment to nuclear weapons as a concept, which undermines the NPT, both directly and indirectly. It silences those states' criticisms of nuclear weapons in the NPT. The "nuclear umbrella" and the US commitment to Europe, means that there is an implied European nuclear deterrent. This also undermines the NPT because states outside Europe, especially in the Non-Aligned Movement, who do not enjoy the nuclear umbrella, treat the matter with considerable scepticism. So we need to tackle NATO's Strategic Concept directly. NATO is meant to be transforming itself into an organisation about resolving conflict and humanitarian intervention. Its nuclear weapon status is a child of the 20th century and now is the time for it to be killed off. If the sub-strategic nuclear weapons were removed as well this would immediately strip out most of the reasons of why many countries outside Europe treat Europe with some scepticism. Europe could still exist under an *implied* nuclear umbrella and all the security that may bring.

In conclusion, Europe needs to hold the Nuclear-Weapon States to account, particularly Britain and France. We need to change the dynamics within NATO and the EU, and among the public, so that they are genuinely forces for peace.

## HON. DOUGLAS ROCHE, O.C

### LESSONS FROM WILLIAM WILBERFORCE PRIORITIES FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS ABOLITION

*Senator Emeritus Douglas Roche is Chair of the Middle Powers Initiative*

The current film, *Amazing Grace*, the story of British parliamentarian William Wilberforce's successful fight to abolish the slave trade, has important lessons for nuclear weapons abolitionists. Although the end of the legalized slave trade occurred a century and a half before the atomic devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the parallels between the campaigns to abolish both evils are striking.

Both slavery and nuclear weapons were and are paramount moral issues of their day. Wilberforce prevailed because, despite repeated failures to get politicians to move, he finally penetrated the moral consciences of the parliamentarians at Westminster.

Slavery was said to be necessary to maintain plantations, which meant wealth. It was claimed that slavery was built into the human order. Those uncomfortable with the social system were afraid to challenge it. But Wilberforce never gave up.

So too, today it is held by the powerful that nuclear weapons are necessary for security. They have been invented and cannot be "dis-invented." Although most people do not want nuclear weapons, the political system rebuffs nuclear abolitionists. Like Wilberforce, we must never give up.


Nuclear weapons are the slavery of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. With their threat of Armageddon, they enslave all of humanity. They are the "ultimate evil." As this century progresses, the political structure must learn that nuclear weapons and humanity cannot coexist, just as slavery and human rights cannot co-exist. Nuclear weapons are a denial of the range of human rights opened up by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

We cannot deal with nuclear weapons by making the conditions of their acceptance more palatable any more than Wilberforce could accept merely a lessening of pressure of the chains around slaves' necks. The total abolition of slavery was required. So too, it will not be enough to have full ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or successful negotiations to ban the production of fissile material; nuclear weapons in their entirety must be done away with. The only hope for peace in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is the total abolition of nuclear weapons. This can be achieved when the social, economic and political structures turn against these weapons of mass murder.

Those who understand all too well the grave danger to the world posed by nuclear weapons dare not be detoured from our goal by the ill-informed, the cynical, and the doubters. If we settle for less than abolition, that is all we will get.

The political value of nuclear weapons must be reduced. Otherwise, the world will develop into a permanent two-class society of nuclear haves and have-nots. It will be the powerful against the weak, the rich against the poor, the warriors against the peace-makers. Such divisions and contentions are unsustainable.

Like the slavery abolitionists, nuclear weapons abolitionists have history on our side. Despite the seemingly impregnable hold of the powerful, new counter-forces are developing and need but the concerted action of enlightened parliamentarians aided by an energized civil society to prevail.



I contend that there are grounds for optimism for three reasons: the historical tide, an existing near consensus on key points, and political developments.

In historical terms, the tide is turning against nuclear weapons. The moral, legal and military case against them is now better understood than ever before. The intellectual argument - that nuclear weapons are needed for security - is now largely rejected by most states as baseless. Only a small coterie of defenders of nuclear weapons can be found today. We know that this coterie still possesses immense political power, as the fight over the retention of the Trident in the UN revealed. But the UN government's wilful and blind determination to modernize its nuclear arsenal ran up against unprecedented opposition. The opponents of nuclear weapons are gathering strength. That itself is a new reason for hope.

A roadmap to the future has been superbly drawn by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, headed by the Swedish diplomat Hans Blix. The Commission's 60 recommendations provide the architecture for global security without nuclear weapons

Though it failed because of the recalcitrance of a small number of states, the 2005 NPT Review Conference identified a near consensus on key elements. In fact, the Working Paper of the Chairman of Main Committee 1 and the Working Paper of the subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament and assurances were supported by strong majorities. These documents said that nuclear weapons states must stop nuclear sharing for military purposes; the most effective way to prevent nuclear terrorism is the total elimination of nuclear weapons; international action to stop proliferation is essential; building upon the decisions taken at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences, including the "unequivocal undertaking" for total nuclear disarmament, no new nuclear weapons should be developed. The fact that these elements did not command complete consensus was a reflection of the obstinacy of the few, not the fissures of the many.

In 2006, all but four states in the UN voted for the holdout states to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, negotiate a ban on the production of fissile materials, diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies, reduce the operational status of nuclear forces, and take other practical steps. This is a significant expression of a world view.

On January 4, 2007, four distinguished American figures - two Republicans and two Democrats - who had never before been identified with nuclear weapons abolition, called for action to reduce nuclear dangers. In a remarkable op-ed article published by the *Wall Street Journal*, George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, both former Secretaries of State under Republican Presidents, and former Democratic Senator Sam Nunn and William J. Perry, former Secretary of Defense in the Clinton administration, warned, "The world is now on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era." They set out a number of urgent steps to achieve "the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons." Initiating a bipartisan process with the US Senate, they said, could achieve, among other gains, U. S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Their article lays the groundwork for new efforts in the US to have the American government become a participant in, not an obstacle to, concrete nuclear disarmament steps.

For the past 18 months, the Middle Powers Initiative has convened four meetings of the Article VI Forum, which has identified specific areas where progress can be made on a consensus basis. The Article VI Forum, inaugurated by MPI following the breakdown of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, seeks to stimulate and shape effective responses to the crisis of the non-proliferation/disarmament regime and to examine the political, technical and legal elements of a nuclear weapons-free world.

Thirty invited states participated in one or more of the four meetings held: 1) at the United Nations in New York in October 2005; 2) at the Clingendael Institute in The Hague in March 2006; 3) at the Foreign Affairs Building in Ottawa in September 2006; 4) at the Vienna International Centre in March 2007.

Out of these meetings, NWI has identified seven priorities for action:

- Verified reduction of nuclear forces
- Standing down of nuclear forces (de-alerting)
- Negotiation of a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty
- Bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force
- Strengthened negative security assurances
- Regulation of nuclear fuel production
- Improved NPT governance

Full details are contained in the new MPI Paper, "Towards 2010: Priorities for NPT Consensus," which MPI will present at the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting April 30-May 11, 2007 in Vienna. The implementation of these measures prior to or at the 2010 NPT Review Conference would propel the non-proliferation /disarmament regime in the right direction, toward universal elimination of nuclear weapons.

The above-outlined measures are valuable in and of themselves. They decrease risks of use, diminish the access of terrorists to catastrophic weapons and materials to build them, raise barriers to acquisition by additional states, and generate support for strengthening the regime and resolving regional crises. Moreover, the measures pass key tests: they do not diminish the security of any state; they reinforce the NPT and enhance the rule of law; they make the world safer now; they move the world towards elimination of nuclear weapons.

Here in the European Parliament, there is much work to do to advance the nuclear disarmament agenda. A good start has been made in the adoption of the recent resolution setting out steps to facilitate a positive outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The only way to ensure progress is for parliamentarians to ratchet up the pressure on governments to move.

Speaking up takes courage and leadership. Parliamentarians have both these attributes. You also have access to the decision-making processes of your governments. I appeal to you to make your voices heard in your parliaments and committee meetings with questions, motions, resolutions and the other tools in your hands.

Ask your ministers and officials precisely why concrete steps to save the NPT in 2010 cannot be taken. Probe why NATO continues to insist in its strategic concept that nuclear weapons are "essential" and why the US continues to station tactical nuclear weapons on the soil of European countries. Challenge governments whether their loyalty to their nuclear friend is greater than their dedication to sparing humanity from a nuclear catastrophe.

I know what parliamentarians can do when you mobilize your strength. Governments dare not ignore you when you speak clearly and forcefully. The new Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament [www.gsintitutc.org/pnnd](http://www.gsintitutc.org/pnnd), a network of more than 483 parliamentarians in 64 parliaments, is at your disposal with helpful information.

Steady movement forward will bring us to our goal: a Nuclear Weapons Convention, prohibiting the production, deployment and use of all nuclear weapons. William Wilberforce, a magnificent parliamentarian, would be with us in this abolition campaign.



## SENATOR PATRIK VANKRUNKELSVEN

*Senator Patrik Vankrunkelsven is a member of the Belgian Liberal Party, Mayor of Laakdal, and Vice-President of Mayors for Peace.*

I am speaking on behalf of the Belgian branch of Mayors for Peace. Firstly I want to say some words in memory of Mayor Itcho Itoh. Mayors for Peace is tremendously shocked and saddened by his tragic murder on April 17. He was a long-time peace and anti-nuclear advocate. He was President of the Japanese Association of Nuclear-Free Local Authorities and Vice-President of Mayors for Peace.



Together with Mayor Akiba he led a really big organisation of 600 cities for some years calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons. He was a very dedicated and effective leader. He worked locally, nationally and internationally to promote an end to these inhumane weapons of mass destruction. In this, he represented not only the people of Nagasaki, including the survivors and families of the victims of the nuclear bombing of the city in 1945. He also represented all the people in this world, now and for future generations. We remember Mayor Itoh fondly and shall continue to pursue the dream he shared with us for a world free from the taint of nuclear weapons.

I want to thank the NGOs who organised this conference. They are doing a good job in making the public aware of the great danger of nuclear arms. They are also pressing the politicians to put this problem on the political agenda. I want to make two points. Firstly, I think we have to strengthen the voice of the European Parliament and the citizens of Europe. Secondly, I am calling for more political leadership.

I want to highlight the resolutions passed by the Belgian Senate and Chamber. These are a matter of pride because Belgium was the first NATO member-state which dared to pass a resolution asking our government to have nuclear disarmament brought up within the framework of NATO. Our words were carefully chosen. We asked for the discussion of a cautious withdrawal of American tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and of the Alliance's nuclear weapons doctrine. We asked them to think about making at least part of Europe a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone. We can be proud of this. I received many congratulations from other NATO member-states, in Germany, the Netherlands, and the UN

But what further developments have there been with this resolution? Werner Bauwens, a good man in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has been working hard diplomatically on this issue. But Belgium, did not dare to bring it to the table in any NATO discussion. We did not dare to tell NATO that our parliament, which represents our citizens, voted unanimously for this resolution. This was because Belgium is afraid of isolation in the Alliance. But why? I have seen the same discussion in Germany where there was also considerable political will to bring this issue up in NATO. They say, "we can't do it alone". It is the same story with Norway. I am a simple physician, but I can count: one and one and one is three. Is that being alone? It is simple. If we really want to do it, then we can organise and speak with other NATO countries to bring it all together. So, I am disappointed at this diplomatic immobility. It may be lack of courage but I think that we need more parliaments to vote on this kind of resolution. This means that governments could no longer say that they are alone in bringing nuclear disarmament up for discussion in NATO and other organisations. So I am asking you, as NGOs, to act on this.

My second point is the need for more political leadership. I was embarrassed when I read some articles in the international press this year. The first was by, among others, former Secretaries of State, Kissinger and Schultz, and former Secretary of Defense Perry, who published an article in the Wall Street Journal, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons". They used language we dared not use in our resolution. They spoke about the total abolition of nuclear weapons. Members of Abolition 2000 are described as "extremists" but we, as good politicians, are told that we should not be associated with such people. Well, my Abolition 2000 friends, you are in good company with Kissinger and Co. They wrote in their letter, "*Reliance on nuclear weapons for defence is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective. The likelihood that non-state terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weaponry is increasing, and non-state terrorist groups with nuclear weapons are outside the bounds of deterrent strategy. The execution of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures towards achieving that goal would be perceived as a bold initiative consistent with America's moral heritage.*"

In Reykjavik in October 1986, a politician we considered to be very conservative, Reagan, did go for the total abolition of nuclear weapons. He called them "totally irrational, totally inhuman, fit for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilisation". Gorbachev shared this vision. So why is it that members of the Belgian parliament, who consider themselves to be peace-loving, dare not use the same language as Ronald Reagan did twenty years ago? Reading this had the same effect on me as standing under a cold shower. It was a good thing that their vision shocked the nuclear deterrence experts. But do we have to be afraid of them?

Gorbachev supported Kissinger and Co's ideas. He said that they, Reagan and Gorbachev, introduced a new vision. But afterwards other political leaders failed to show the same leadership. The military doctrines of the major powers, the US and, to some extent, Russia, have revived the idea that nuclear weapons are an acceptable means of war-fighting, and they maintain a first-strike option. Two decades later we ask all political leaders to have the same courage, the same leadership, as Gorbachev and Reagan. Go for Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones in Europe and in other parts of the world. This would be a first step for Europe which could then challenge the UK and France about their nuclear weapons. But why do De Gucht in my country and the ministers of Foreign Affairs in Germany and Norway not dare to discuss it with each other at the next NATO meeting? Would it be silly to do that? No, it would only be as silly as Kissinger, Gorbachev and other famous political leaders. That would be leadership. That is what all citizens really desire and hope for.

## XANTHÉ HALL

### COMPLIANCE WITH THE NPT

The way ahead for the EU to pursue nuclear disarmament:  
A Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Europa

*Xanthé Hall is the Co-Director of International Physicians  
for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Germany*

First of all, I would like to ask those of you who knew Janet Bloomfield, one of the founding mothers of Abolition 2000, to hold a picture of her in your minds and remember her for a moment. Today it is her funeral in Saffron Walden, and she will be sorely missed by us all.



On the train here, I heard two men discussing the gunman who ran amok at Virginia Tech. One man was from the United States and the other from Europe. The man from the US was of the opinion that one needed to be armed against all eventualities and was worried about terrorism. The European said that our understanding of security in Europe was different and that we didn't feel so threatened. That relates to what Doug Roche was saying, when he reminded us that Europe has lived through two World Wars as a battlefield. Europe's security is based on confidence building and learning to trust, build trade and friendships. The lesson was: weapons do not provide security because they will inevitably be used. Our US affiliate discovered that the majority of people visiting emergency rooms because of gunshot wounds had been injured by their own gun, not someone else's.

I came to live in Berlin in 1985 and was fascinated by the Berlin Wall, which stood as a symbol of the Cold War and the East-West Conflict. In May 1989, the editor of an English language magazine I was working for suggested that we write a feature on what would happen "when the Wall comes down". All of us laughed and said it was a non-starter. It simply wasn't going to happen. And yet just six months later it did.

What led up to the Fall of the Wall were the "Monday demonstrations". At the beginning, just a handful of people demonstrated every Monday. But their numbers grew and grew and more and more people kept coming until their numbers were so many, they could no longer be ignored. What I mean to say is that history works like that. It is not a slow continuum, but full of very sudden changes that need a certain kind of continuous pressure to make them come about. In the area of nuclear disarmament we are applying the pressure, but our numbers need to grow, and we need to know where the pressure needs to be applied in order to bring about a sudden change. It is like acupuncture.

Back in 1995 during the Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Global Network for the elimination of nuclear weapons "Abolition 2000" began to form. Our goal at that time was to make the abolition of nuclear weapons – the Article VI obligation – tenable. For many years leading up to that time, the word "abolition" was hardly used, and the concept of "disarmament" was interpreted as meaning "reductions" and not "total elimination". We managed to reverse this tendency amongst the negotiators and this was cemented by the decision of the ICJ in their historic opinion of July 1996.

In the following five years leading up to the Review Conference of 2000, a movement grew – with the help of the Middle Powers Initiative and the New Agenda Coalition - that peaked in the 13 steps and the “unequivocal undertaking”. Despite the intransigence of the Nuclear-Weapon States, in particular the US that has set the trend, in the following 5 to 7 years that preceded the all-time-low we are presently witnessing, this general consensus – that disarmament is synonymous with abolition in the long-term, and that proliferation is related to the absence of real disarmament – is still valid. This reflects a broad societal consensus that nuclear weapons need to be abolished.

The European Union adheres to this consensus, at least on paper. The problem arises when it comes to real action and not just words. It is simply not enough to keep repeating mantras and hoping that the political will in the Nuclear-Weapon States will change. Looking to elections as an answer to this problem is a sign of helplessness and shows a lack of creative solutions.

On the other hand, it is not realistic to expect that Europe will rise up against the US or Russia and demand immediate and total disarmament. And yet there is something small, but important, that can be done. And here I refer to recommendation 22 of the Blix report “Weapons of Terror”: “Every state that possesses nuclear weapons should make a commitment not to deploy any nuclear weapon, of any type, on foreign soil”. I would add, “and those who host such foreign deployments should desist in doing so.”

Five European states are still host to US nuclear weapons that are virtually militarily useless – Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Turkey and the United Kingdom. There are an estimated 480 free fall gravity bombs based in these countries that are assigned to NATO. The practice of “nuclear sharing” means that these countries not only provide the bases where the nuclear weapons are stored, but also aeroplanes and trained pilots to deliver them to their targets.

There are a number of arguments why this practice should be ended:

1. It is a clear violation of the NPT that stipulates that Nuclear-Weapon States are not permitted to transfer nuclear weapons to Non-Nuclear Weapon States, nor are the latter allowed to receive or seek to acquire them. The argument often used – that these weapons would only be transferred in time of war, when the NPT would no longer apply, does not counter the fact that this transfer is constantly planned and trained for. In law, planning to murder is tantamount to murder itself.
2. Continuing to rely on nuclear weapons for security (an oxymoron in itself), as NATO countries do, puts those countries in a position that makes negotiation with “wannabe” states not credible. There is no longer any reason to believe that (a) nuclear weapons can provide any security against today’s threats for Europe and (b) that giving them up would cause any damage to the unity of NATO.
3. The cost of keeping nuclear sharing is not known and should – in my view – be made transparent for parliamentarians and citizens. Every attempt so far to receive any information through democratic processes on these bombs has failed, due to secrecy. But there is some evidence that these costs are excessively high for both the host countries and the US. This money needs to be freed up for protection against today’s real threats to our security – such as global warming.
4. The benefits to disarmament and non-proliferation are clear:
  - a.) it would send a message to potential proliferators that Europe sees no future for its security with nuclear weapons, therefore reducing the threat level. As a confidence building measure it would improve the EU position as mediator in the

conflict with Iran. At present the EU is not perceived as neutral in this question, because – among other things - of the NATO nuclear alliance;

b.) it puts the ball in the Russian court to begin talks on tactical weapons – a massive problem that still urgently needs to be solved;

c.) getting rid of US nuclear weapons in Europe could lead the way to a “core Europe” Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone that could in turn put pressure on the UK and France to relinquish their nuclear weapons.

There is simply no convincing argument for the retention of these weapons. Greece got rid of theirs in a quiet way. Other NATO member states do not have them and are in no way lesser members. The myth that these weapons bestow any special status on the host countries is belied by the fact that NATO operates on a basis of consensus. In any case, European countries would be better served using their economic strength to influence the Nuclear-Weapon States, rather than by buying into the nuclear doctrine.

The European Union should actively pursue the idea of a nuclear weapon free within Europe and encourage its members to join it by renouncing the deployment of nuclear weapons and ending the practice of nuclear sharing. It is already perfectly feasible to continue to seek common positions in the EU while also retaining differing statuses as regards the possession of nuclear weapons and neutrality. It must also be possible to have a majority policy on nuclear weapons, reflecting a Union made up of mostly Non-Nuclear Weapon States, that underlines Article VI (disarmament) and Article II (the renunciation of nuclear weapons), while continuing to hold the door open to dialogue with the two Nuclear-Weapon States in the Union. The first step of withdrawal of US nuclear weapons would not require these two European Nuclear-Weapon States to disarm, but would nevertheless set an example, putting pressure on them to follow suit.

While the EU will no doubt present a common position at the NPT, EU members could – and have in the past – presented their own ideas to the conference. It is our hope in Germany that we will – through a 3 year long pressure campaign entitled “our future – nuclear weapon free” – move our government to announce the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons and the ending of nuclear sharing, as the German contribution to Article VI, at the NPT Review Conference in 2010. 87% of Germans would support this, as do all political parties except the Christian Democrats. We would welcome similar campaigns in the other four nuclear sharing countries and widespread support from the Non-Nuclear Weapon States in the EU.

To finish up, I would like to say a few more words about the “paradigm change” that I mentioned in an earlier intervention today. The United Kingdom and the other Nuclear-Weapon States are arrested in a “control” paradigm due to fear of attack and the desire to maintain the status of a “world power”. But the fear of attack is bound up with their foreign policy and involvement in defending expansionist interests as a world power. Countries that do not attack or threaten to attack other countries or are not proponents of regime change are less likely to need to fear attack. It is a vicious circle.

What we need to understand is what the sustainable security paradigm actually means. We need to develop an alternative strategy that can answer the fear driving Trident replacement and the retention of nuclear weapons. Is this not the same fear that drives the gun-owner in the US? That someone could run amok in his world and shoot his children? Instead of fear of the future, we need to shape a future that inspires *confidence* in our security through trust and cooperation.

**AN INTERVENTION BY THE CHANCELLOR  
OF THE EMBASSY OF ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT TO BELGIUM**

From our point of view, the whole non-proliferation regime rests on two principles. Firstly, there is the transparency, credibility, and accountability of the countries which have signed the NPT. The other principle is the universality of the NPT. One of the speakers today said that we should rejoice in the near-universality of the Treaty. I beg to differ. The countries outside the NPT are the problematic ones. We must never forget that two countries, North Korea and Iran, have either withdrawn from the NPT or threatened to. We could see the whole system unraveling. So we cannot be happy while the NPT is almost universal. It has to be completely universal.

Many countries wish to have the fruits of the NPT, nuclear power. There certainly have to be safeguards. But there also has to be a new guidebook for such countries. Otherwise there would be no point at all having the NPT without being able to enjoy the peaceful fruits of nuclear energy.

Egypt has been lobbying for decades to establish a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East. There are only two countries in this area that are problematic. One is Iran which is a signatory to the NPT. The other is Israel, which is not a signatory. They each have their own views on this matter. It was mentioned today that Israel says that it needs nuclear weapons to guarantee its security. This is a myth that has to be re-visited. Israel had nuclear weapons in 1973. This did not prevent Egypt, my own country, from starting a war. Nuclear weapons did not stop the war last year between Israel and Lebanon. Israel's nuclear weapons are not working even as a deterrent. What will guarantee Israel's security is peace - like the agreement it signed with Egypt in 1979. At that time it was Anwar Sadat who persuaded Israel to enter serious discussions about peace. He did this with the support of the International Community, including America and Britain.

My last point is that the existing UN structures are in the best position to promote the non-proliferation regime. We should not forget that it was the UN which brought an end to Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear programmes. But no one gives the UN the credit for this. We should therefore grant the IAEA more authority and responsibility.

## POL D'HUYVETTER

### FINAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE CONFERENCE

*Pol d'Huyvetter is the Co-ordinator of Abolition 2000 Europe.*

During the conference several proposals gained general support.

- The European Parliament should become more actively involved in, and develop a balanced approach to, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. It should take account of the resolutions it has already adopted, and of the recommendations of the Blix Commission's report on Weapons of Mass Destruction.
- To be credible partners in non-proliferation, the European Union (EU) is encouraged to work on the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons deployed in Belgium, Britain, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. The EU is also asked to urge Britain and France to comply with the disarmament obligations contained in Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
- Parliamentarians, including members of the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament, should act within the NATO Parliamentary Assembly to promote change in NATO nuclear policies and practices.
- The European Parliament should liaise more with European governments to promote nuclear disarmament and to encourage the establishment of Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones (NWFZ) in Europe as a stepping stone towards global nuclear abolition. These could include a Central European NWFZ and a Northern Europe/Arctic NWFZ.
- Members of the European Parliament are encouraged to collaborate with mayors on such initiatives as the Mayors and Parliamentarians Joint Statement for a Nuclear Weapons-Free world, and also on promoting *Mayors for Peace* and the *Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament* (PNND) among mayors and parliamentarians respectively.
- NGOs and parliamentarians pledged support for the achievement of a Nuclear Weapons Convention (a global treaty for the abolition of nuclear weapons) and for initiatives such as the 2020 Vision Campaign of Mayors for Peace which aims to rid the world of nuclear weapons by 2020. Special attention is given to the current membership drive of Mayors for Peace which aims to enroll 2020 members by its 25th anniversary on June 24th 2007.
- Because awareness of the dangers of nuclear weapons and further proliferation is very limited, the European Union is encouraged to provide funding for peace education.
- Parliamentarians, mayors and NGOS are encouraged to promote the op-ed in the Wall Street Journal on 4 January 2007 by Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry and Sam Nunn which called for a world free of nuclear weapons. European leaders are requested to break the silence and follow the wise call by these conservative former US leaders.

Finally the organizers of the Conference welcome the establishment today of a cross-party section of the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament (PNND) in the European Parliament. The PNND EP section welcomes as Co-chair Angelika Beer (Greens) and Vice-chairs Ana Gomes (PSE), Annemie Neyts (ALDE), Andre Brie (GUE) and Girts Kristovskis (UEN).

